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MAIN 


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America  and  Britain 


THE    STORY   OF   THE    RELATIONS 
BETWEEN   TWO    PEOPLES 


BY 
H.    H.    POWERS 

AUTHOR    OF 

"THE    THINGS    MEN    FIGHT    FOR 

"  AMERICA  AMONG  THE  NATIONS' 

ETC. 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 
1918 

jlIl  rights  reserved 


COPYRIGHT,  1918, 
BY  THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY. 


Set  up  and  clectrotyped.    Published  September,  1918. 


3.  B.  Cashing  Co.  —  Berwick  &  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Mass.,  U.S.A. 


INTRODUCTION 

THIS  is  not  an  argument  but  a  story,  the  story  of 
our  relation  with  that  people  with  whom  we  have  had 
more  to  do,  —  and  must  seemingly  continue  to  have 
more  to  do,  —  than  with  any  other  in  the  world.  If 
the  story  seems  to  argue  as  it  goes  on,  it  is  because, 
like  other  stories,  it  has  its  moral,  a  moral  which  it  is 
not  purposed  either  to  emphasize  or  to  avoid.  Such 
bias  as  it  may  have  is  the  unconscious  bias  of  an  Ameri 
can  of  American  lineage,  but  an  American  who  has 
seen  much  of  Britain's  work  in  the  world,  as  well  as 
that  of  other  nations  who  work  on  somewhat  different 
lines.  Whatever  the  result  of  these  experiences,  the 
aim  has  been  to  tell  the  story  just  as  it  happened, 
omitting  details  only  because  they  seem  unimportant, 
never  because  they  make  for  this  or  that  conclusion. 
If  the  conclusion  reached  is  at  variance  with  tradi 
tion,  it  is  because  a  juster  balance  is  held  between  those 
showy  and  dramatic  happenings  upon  which  the 
popular  imagination  loves  to  dwell,  and  the  quiet, 
unobtrusive  factors  which  so  often  quite  outweigh 
them  in  importance.  An  effort  has  also  been  made 
to  view  these  international  situations  somewhat  from 
both  ends.  We  are  prone  to  remember  our  end  of  a 
transaction  and  forget  the  other,  even  though  the  one 
may  be  quite  unintelligible  without  the  other.  It  is 
hoped  that  in  certain  cases  the  key  to  an  understand 
ing  has  thus  been  supplied. 

The  story  of  Anglo-American  relations  is  not  an  idyll 
or  a  tale  of  mutual  chivalry  and  devotion.  It  is  the 

' 


INTRODUCTION 


record  of  two  very  human  peoples,  both  keen  in  the 
pursuit  of  self-interest  and  much  more  conscious  of 
immediate  than  of  ultimate  ends.  But  it  is  the  story 
of  peoples  that  on  the  whole  have  gotten  on  together, 
that  have  differed  and  even  quarreled  without  perma 
nent  estrangement,  and  that  have  known  how  to  tem 
per  the  sordidness  of  self-interest  with  something  of 
magnanimity  and  broader  vision.  Often  dwelling  in 
thought  upon  surface  differences,  they  have  never 
escaped  the  subconscious  realization  that  they  were 
one  people,  having  infinitely  more  in  common  than  in 
contrast,  and  approaching  by  slightly  different  paths 
an  identical  goal.  Mutual  helpfulness  has  not  been 
their  constant  care,  but  it  has  been  their  unfailing  atti 
tude  in  all  great  crises  of  their  experience.  Not  a 
single  crisis  of  our  history  could  have  been  safely  passed 
without  the  sympathy  if  not  the  positive  help  of  Britain. 
We  may  safely  add  that  henceforth  not  a  single  crisis 
in  the  history  of  either  can  be  safely  passed  without 
mutual  aid  and  help. 

But  these  general  considerations  of  policy  will  not 
of  themselves  insure  the  necessary  mutuality.  The 
life  of  all  peoples  is  much  more  instinctive  than  cal 
culating,  and  if  Anglo-Saxon  mutuality  is  to  be  an 
effective  fact  in  the  critical  days  before  us,  it  will  be 
because  the  habit  has  been  slowly  forming  in  the  past. 
What  has  been  the  underlying  instinct  in  Anglo- 
American  relations  in  the  past?  It  is  to  answer 
this  question,  —  not  to  beg  the  question,  —  that  these 
pages  are  written. 


iv 


AMERICA  AND  BRITAIN 


THE  BRITISH  ORIGIN  OF  AMERICA 

IT  is  to  be  noted  first  of  all  that  our  nation  is  of 
British  origin.  We  are  a  development  from  the  British 
colonies  planted  in  North  America  during  our  racial 
the  seventeenth  century.  It  is  true  that  complexity 
other  colonies,  Spanish,  French,  Dutch,  and  Swedish, 
were  planted  in  America  about  the  same  tune,  and  that 
these  have  made  their  contribution  to  the  American 
commonwealth.  This  fact,  taken  in  connection  with 
the  exceedingly  varied  immigration  of  later  times  from 
all  countries  of  Europe  and  even  from  Asia  and  Africa, 
is  often  cited  in  refutation  of  this  theory  of  British 
origin.  But  this  argument  is  really  beside  the  mark. 
It  only  proves  that  our  people  are  of  composite  origin. 
But  that  is  true  of  every  people.  The  ancient  Greeks 
were  of  very  mixed  origin,  but  they  were  none  the  less 
Greek.  The  British  people  are  sprung  from  ancient 
Britons,  Angles,  Saxons,  Danes,  and  Normans,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  numberless  immigrants  of  every  sort 
and  the  mingling  of  Welsh,  Scotch,  and  Irish  blood 
which  has  gone  on  for  centuries.  Yet  they  are  very 
British.  So  the  American  people  has  been  recruited 


AMERICA  AND  BRITAIN 


from  ahncst 'every  race  under  the  sun,  but  it  has  been 
assimilated  or  is  being  assimilated  to  a  type  as  uniform 
as  that  of  any  other  people. 

But  the  fact  that  our  people  are  of  mixed  origin  does 
not  mean  that  our  nation  is  a  conglomerate  or  that  our 
CivUization  culture  is  a  compromise  between  different 
not  complex  contributing  elements.  Our  language,  for 
instance,  is  not  a  medley  of  English,  French,  German, 
Italian,  Russian,  Syrian,  and  the  like.  It  is  English, 
the  other  languages  being  represented  at  most  by  a 
few  scattering  words  which  rapidly  become  anglicized 
beyond  recognition.  And  the  same  is  true  of  all  that 
is  essential  in  our  political  and  social  institutions.  The 
influence  of  the  French,  Spanish,  and  Dutch  can  be 
traced  in  our  laws  and  customs,  but  only  locally  and 
in  matters  of  detail,  much  as  in  our  speech.  Even 
where  their  language  and  institutions  have  a  certain 
independent  existence,  as  in  Louisiana  and  New  Mex 
ico,  they  are  clearly  losing  ground.  Those  who  speak 
French  or  Spanish  speak  English  also,  or  are  learning 
to  do  so.  Only  the  British  speech  and  British  institu 
tions  have  been  able  to  persist,  to  enlarge  their  terri 
tory,  and  to  absorb  or  suppress  competing  systems. 
It  is  therefore  perfectly  correct  to  say  that  our 
country  and  our  civilization  are  of  British  origin, 
the  non-British  elements  of  our  population  hav 
ing  failed  to  maintain  their  earlier  type  and  allowed 
themselves  to  be  assimilated  to  a  type  essentially 
British. 

This  important  truth  is  somewhat  obscured  by  the 

2 


THE  BRITISH  ORIGIN  OF  AMERICA 

fact  that  immigration  is  still  actively  going  on,  and 
large  numbers  of  newcomers  are  always  with  us. 
Some  of  these  remain  very  foreign,  and  immigration 
where  many  of  a  kind  are  congregated  stm  active 
there  may  sometimes  be  found  real  foreign  communi 
ties,  with  foreign  speech,  foreign  schools  and  churches, 
and  foreign  customs  and  ideals.  But  if  we  study 
these  communities,  we  shall  find  that  they  are  merely 
receiving  stations  through  which  arriving  foreigners 
are  constantly  passing  out  into  the  great  American 
beyond.  Individual  Germans  or  Scandinavians  may 
stay  in  such  communities  all  their  lives  and  hardly 
become  American  at  all,  but  their  descendants  cannot 
do  so,  and  unless  their  places  are  taken  by  new  arrivals, 
the  community  soon  loses  its  foreign  character  and 
undergoes  the  inevitable  transformation  into  a  type 
which  though  not  present-day  English,  is  plainly  de 
rived  from  the  English  of  colonial  days. 

The  British  colonists  who  thus  set  the  pace  which 
all  others  were  to  follow,  were  not  average  Englishmen. 
They  were  for  the  most  part  malcontents  Exce  ^ona! 
who  protested  against  established  beliefs  character  of 
and  practices.  They  were  perhaps  no  more  colomsts 
reasonable  than  other  people,  but  they  were  certainly 
more  independent  and  energetic,  qualities  of  value  if 
turned  to  wise  account.  Meanwhile  societies  of  es 
tablished  ways  and  settled  traditions  found  them  very 
troublesome.  They  were  a  problem  in  all  the  Euro 
pean  countries,  but  different  countries  dealt  with  the 
problem  in  very  different  ways.  England  early 

3 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


adopted  the  policy  of  allowing  these  troublesome  ele 
ments  to  migrate  to  the  New  World  and  found  com 
munities  according  to  their  own  ideas.  She  gave 
them  no  help  and  attempted  no  interference.  She 
thought  herself  fortunate  to  be  rid  of  them  on  these 
terms,  and  they  thought  themselves  lucky  to  get  off 
thus  easily.  Probably  both  were  right. 

France  adopted  a  very  different  policy.  She  would 
have  no  dissenters  in  the  New  France  that  she  was 
French  creating.  So  she  persecuted  her  dissenters 
colonization  and  expelled  them  from  all  her  dominions. 
P°  icy  Meanwhile  she  sought  for  regular  and  nor 

mal  persons  to  people  her  colonies.  But  people  who 
are  regular  and  in  harmony  with  the  ideas  and  prac 
tices  of  those  about  them  do  not  care  to  go  to  distant 
lands  and  alien  environments.  They  prefer  to  stay 
where  they  are.  So  France  found  few  colonists, 
though  she  offered  them  moneyed  assistance  and  large 
inducements.  The  English  colonies  consequently  grew 
much  faster  than  the  French,  and  when,  following  the 
lead  of  the  home  countries,  they  became  involved  in 
hostilities  with  each  other,  the  more  energetic  and  more 
populous  English  colonies  inevitably  prevailed.  It  is 
a  curious  fact  that  Canada,  Britain's  chief  possession 
in  America  to-day,  is  the  outgrowth  of  one  of  these 
French  colonies,  the  colonies  of  her  own  founding 
having  slipped  the  leash  of  her  control. 

One  more  fact  must  be  noted  if  we  are  to  under 
stand  this  earlier  situation.  The  colonies  were  far 
away  from  England  and  communication  was  infrequent 

4 


THE   BRITISH  ORIGIN  OF  AMERICA 

and  slow.  This  tended  strongly  to  confirm  the  let- 
alone  policy  which  England  had  adopted  with  refer 
ence  to  these  troublesome  dissenters.  Most  Politicai 
matters  that  came  up  for  discussion  were  too  effect  of 
unimportant  or  too  urgent  to  be  referred  isolatlon 
to  England  for  settlement.  And  since  these  matters 
chiefly  concerned  the  colonists,  who  were  not  savages 
but  Englishmen,  and  quite  as  competent  as  the  Eng 
lishmen  at  home,  there  was  every  reason  for  leaving 
to  them  matters  which  they  understood  so  much  better 
than  any  one  in  England.  The  colonists  of  course 
regarded  themselves  as  British  subjects  and  were  so 
regarded  at  home,  but  they  were  stiff-necked  and 
opinionated,  and  a  prudent  statesman  would  avoid 
unnecessary  interference  with  them.  And  since  their 
geographical  separation  from  the  mother  country  made 
pretty  much  all  interference  unnecessary,  the  policy 
of  letting  them  manage  their  own  affairs  became  a 
habit,  and  the  habit  in  turn  came  to  be  a  right  which 
only  a  very  bold  or  a  very  foolish  man  would  question. 
Among  the  governors  sent  out  to  the  colonies  by  the 
British  king  there  were  occasionally  such  men,  but 
they  came  to  grief,  and  their  failure  only  confirmed 
the  habitual  independence  of  the  colonies.  This  in 
dependence  was  not  due  to  any  of  those  later  theories 
about  the  universal  right  to  liberty.  It  was  due  to 
the  fact  that  England  allowed  certain  of  the  most 
unmanageable  of  her  people  to  move  quite  beyond 
the  reach  of  her  effective  control. 
Meanwhile  in  the  century  and  a  half  of  this  colonial 
5 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


period  England  herself  underwent  very  great  changes. 
The  dissenters  did  not  all  go  to  the  colonies.  Many  of 
Political  them  remained  to  make  trouble  for  the 
changes  in  established  order.  They  won  adherents 
England  an(j  became  bo^  jn  asserting  their  will.  A 
king  and  an  archbishop  who  resisted  them  lost  their 
heads  and  another  king  his  throne.  English  rulers 
became  circumspect,  and  habitual  deference  to  the 
will  of  the  people  developed  those  free  institutions  and 
popular  liberties  which  are  the  glory  of  England.  Un 
consciously  the  English  people  were  coming  over  to 
the  position  of  the  colonies,  winning  by  a  bitter  struggle 
the  privileges  which  the  colonists  enjoyed  by  virtue 
of  their  peculiar  situation.  Neither  side  realized  for 
a  time  where  the  other  side  stood,  and  so  they  were 
less  prompt  to  understand  and  help  each  other  than 
could  have  been  wished.  But  there  were  not  wanting 
those  who  saw  clearly  that  both  stood  for  the  same 
things  and  proclaimed  this  fact  in  dark  hours  of  con 
fusion  and  distrust.  It  is  but  fair  to  say  that  these 
men  of  broader  vision  were  more  numerous  in  England 
than  in  the  colonies.  There  was  something  very  en 
grossing  about  life  in  these  primitive  settlements  which 
did  not  tend  to  broad  sympathies.  England  touched 
the  world  so  closely  and  at  so  many  points  that  she 
had  even  then  something  of  that  world  consciousness 
which  has  been  the  fruit  of  her  wide  experience.  But 
we  lived  much  unto  ourselves  and  touched  the  great 
world  very  little.  What  wonder  that  we  hardly  real 
ized  the  change  that  England  had  undergone. 

6 


n 

THE  RUPTURE  WITH  ENGLAND 

BOTH  England  and  the  colonies  were  rudely  jostled 
out  of  their  comfortable  habits  by  the  attempt  of  a 
foolish  king  to  assert  a  vanished  authority.  For  a 
long  time  the  kings,  while  maintaining  the  fiction  of 
royal  authority,  had  been  in  the  habit  of  respecting 
the  wishes  of  the  people  as  expressed  through  Parlia 
ment,  and  here,  as  in  the  colonies,  habit  had  come  to 
be  regarded  as  a  right.  But  when  George  III  came  to 
the  throne,  his  ambitious  mother  is  said  to  have  given 
him  as  her  parting  advice :  "  Be  a  king,  George.  Be 
a  king,"  which  of  course  meant  that  he  should  exercise 
real  authority  and  not  allow  continued  deference  to 
destroy  his  right  to  rule.  This  advice  he  proceeded  to 
follow,  being  intent,  apparently,  rather  upon  restor 
ing  his  authority  than  upon  accomplishing  anything 
definite  by  its  exercise.  But  mindful  of  the  fate  of  his 
predecessors,  he  did  not  venture  openly  to  resist  Par 
liament,  but  tried  the  more  insidious  method  of  cor 
rupting  it.  In  the  colonies  he  adopted  the  direct 
method  of  asserting  his  authority  through  his  ministers. 
In  both  cases  he  was  entirely  within  his  theoretical 
legal  rights,  but  in  both  cases  he  was  overriding  long 
standing  privileges,  which  was  of  course  precisely  what 
he  had  set  out  to  do.  In  both  cases  he  encountered 
bitter  opposition,  though  a  minority  stood  by  him.  In 

7 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


both  cases  he  ultimately  failed,  and  the  rights  which 
before  had  been  nothing  but  habitual  concessions  were 
established  by  firm  guarantees. 

But  unfortunately  the  two  cases  were  not  outwardly 
alike  and  the  two  natural  allies  did  not  at  once  see 
Attitude  of  tne*r  common  interest.  The  British  people 
English  and  deeply  resented  the  corruption  of  Parlia 
ment  and  the  perversion  of  the  means  by 
which  they  were  accustomed  to  express  their  will. 
The  colonists,  on  the  other  hand,  hardly  knew  of  this 
and  did  not  base  their  protest  upon  that  ground. 
They  objected  to  the  exercise  of  any  home  authority 
over  them,  whether  legitimate  or  otherwise.  This 
seemed  to  the  people  at  home  to  be  very  extreme 
ground.  They  respected  the  authority  of  Parliament 
when  it  was  not  corrupted,  and  it  seemed  to  them  that 
every  Englishman  should  do  so,  no  matter  where  he 
lived.  They  did  not  realize  that  Englishmen  living 
thousands  of  miles  away,  and  with  little  access  or 
communication,  could  not  express  their  will  through 
Parliament  as  the  home  people  could  do.  The  trouble 
was  that  in  theory  England  had  always  governed  her 
colonies,  and  in  practice  they  had  always  governed 
themselves.  Englishmen  were  conscious  of  the  theory, 
and  the  colonists  were  conscious  of  the  practice.  So 
when  the  colonists  declared  that  they  were  independ 
ent,  that  they  always  had  been  so,  and  that  no  other 
arrangement  was  practicable  or  right,  most  Englishmen 
thought  this  a  very  monstrous  doctrine.  If  the  king 
had  not  been  alienating  the  home  people  at  the  same 


THE  RUPTURE  WITH  ENGLAND 

time,  he  would  doubtless  have  had  their  very  strong 
support  for  the  contention  that  every  Englishman, 
no  matter  where  he  lived,  should  recognize  the  authority 
of  Parliament,  for  they  had  not  yet  learned  that  there 
are  practical  limitations  to  the  exercise  of  such  au 
thority.  As  it  was,  he  got  very  little  support,  for  they 
were  righting  their  own  battle  for  the  right  to  manage 
their  own  affairs,  just  as  the  colonists  were  doing.  It 
is  a  pity  they  did  not  see  that  the  colonists  were  fight 
ing  for  the  same  thing  and  that  their  very  different 
way  of  putting  their  case  was  only  due  to  differences 
of  situation.  It  is  a  pity,  too,  that  the  colonists  did 
not  perceive  how  the  English  people  were  recognizing 
their  principle  in  the  very  different  application  which 
suited  their  circumstances.  A  pity,  it  is  true,  but  not 
surprising  on  either  side.  Great  principles  detach 
themselves  but  slowly  from  entangling  circumstance, 
and  Anglo-Saxons  were  feeling  their  way  as  yet  toward 
those  principles  which  have  since  become  the  corner 
stone  of  their  civilization. 

So   with    much    of   misunderstanding    the   English 
people  and  the  colonists  fought  in  unconscious  alliance 
and  succeeded  where  either  alone  would   Amance  Of 
have  failed.     It  was  settled  once  for  all  English  and 
that  the  king  must  not  resist  Parliament  colonists 
or  try  to  influence  its  decisions  in  any  way.     So  sensi 
tive  have  the  English  people  become  on  this  point 
that  when,  half  a  century  later,  a  member  of  the  royal 
family  went  to  the  House  of  Commons  to  listen  to  a 
debate,  it  evoked  a  storm  of  protest  as  a  disguised 

9 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


attempt  to  influence  Parliamentary  opinion.  The 
innocent  attempt  has  never  been  repeated.  The 
royal  family  are  the  only  Englishmen  who  have  no 
right  to  influence  political  opinion  in  England. 

And  it  was  settled  equally  and  for  all  time  that 
the  colonies  were  independent  and  had  the  right  to 

manage    their    own    affairs.     It   was   the 
Independ-  .  in-  • 

ence  of  colo-  thirteen  rebellious  colonies  mat  first  won 

nies  recog-  this  acknowledgment,  which  they  em 
phasized  by  brushing  aside  all  the  forms 
of  British  rule  which  the  king's  ill-judged  attempt  had 
made  odious,  but  they  were  no  more  independent  than 
they  always  had  been.  That  was  the  ground  which 
they  took  from  the  first  and  very  wisely.  They  had 
always  managed  their  own  affairs  and  had  proved 
themselves  quite  competent  to  do  so.  Moreover,  as 
they  were  situated,  there  was  no  other  practicable 
way  in  which  these  affairs  could  be  managed.  This 
had  always  been  recognized  tacitly  until  the  king 
challenged  it,  and  henceforth  it  was  recognized  con 
sciously,  both  by  the  king  and  by  the  people.  The 
English  people  are  a  practical  people,  and  when  it  was 
really  brought  to  their  mind,  they  could  see  that 
Parliament  could  not  wisely  manage  the  affairs  of 
Americans  whom  they  never  saw  and  of  whose  situa 
tion  they  knew  next  to  nothing. 

And  so  there  followed  from  our  rebellion  another 
result  that  Americans  are  quite  too  prone  to  forget. 
England  not  only  recognized  the  independence  of  the 
thirteen  colonies  that  rebelled,  but  of  all  her  other 

10 


THE  RUPTURE  WITH  ENGLAND 

colonies  where  Englishmen  held  control.  One  after 
another  she  has  recognized  the  independence  of 
Canada,  Newfoundland,  Australia,  New  ^  colonies 
Zealand,  and  even  of  South  Africa,  though  win  inde- 
its  Dutch  population  had  been  so  recently  Pendence 
at  war  with  the  British  Empire.  These  great  colonies 
have  not  discarded  the  British  flag  and  the  outward 
forms  of  British  rule  as  we  did,  simply  because  no 
foolish  monarch  alienated  them  as  he  did  us,  but  they 
are  just  as  independent  as  we  are.  Canada  retains 
the  British  flag,  but  she  has  been  openly  told  that 
she  may  discard  it,  —  may  adopt  the  stars  and  stripes 
or  a  flag  of  her  own,  —  any  time  she  chooses.  She 
has  a  governor  sent  from  England,  but  he  does  not 
govern  and  his  signature  to  bills  passed  by  the  Cana 
dian  Parliament  is  perfunctory  and  compulsory. 
Canada  makes  her  own  laws,  enacts  her  own  tariffs, 
—  against  England  as  well  as  against  other  nations,  — 
makes  treaties  with  other  nations  independent  of  Eng 
land,  even  decides  upon  war  or  peace  independently 
of  the  mother  country.  What  more  can  we  do?  Our 
case  was  merely  the  test  case,  that  is  all.  Once  settled, 
it  was  settled  for  Canada,  for  Australia,  for  all  the  rest. 
Slowly  even  India  and  Egypt,  with  their  more  back 
ward  peoples,  are  achieving  the  same  independence.  It 
is  the  British  principle,  a  principle  first  established  in 
connection  with  us,  the  first  British  Colony  that  came 
of  age.  It  is  not  strange  that  this  first  case  caused 
some  misunderstanding  and  some  mutual  irritation. 
It  is  not  strange  that  the  British  people  had  to  learn 

ii 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


the  great  lesson  once.  The  strange  thing  is  that  they 
had  to  learn  it  only  once.  Most  lessons  require  repe 
tition. 

This  great  achievement  is  in  the  main  a  matter  for 
profound  congratulation.  It  taught  the  world  how 

nations  could  hold   together,  —  like  Eng- 
The  Loyal-  „  , . 

ists  and         land,    Canada,    and   Australia,  —  and   yet 

their  griev-  remain  free,  giving  us  thus  the  key  to  the 
great  problem  of  the  future.  But  it  had 
its  unfortunate  incidents  as  well.  Those  of  the  colo 
nists  who  did  not  approve  the  policy  of  complete  sepa 
ration,  but  would  rather  have  achieved  independence 
with  union  as  Canada  has  done,  —  a  plan  that  then 
seemed  impracticable,  —  found  no  sympathy  with  the 
majority  and  were  obliged  to  flee  the  country  to  avoid 
a  worse  fate.  Many  of  them  went  to  Canada,  where 
they  nursed  and  propagated  their  resentment  in  a  way 
which  is  much  to  be  regretted.  Their  loyalty  to 
England  made  them  enemies  of  the  colonial  cause  and 
aroused  the  antipathies  which  civil  war  more  than  any 
other  is  sure  to  engender.  These  antipathies  in  their 
turn  made  it  impossible  for  them  later  to  return  and 
effectually  prevented  any  later  exercise  of  magnanimity, 
—  perhaps  even  of  justice,  —  by  the  victorious  colo 
nists  towards  them.  It  is  in  part  due  to  this  fact  that 
a  war  which  closed  with  essential  agreement  did  not 
close  with  sympathy. 

More  serious  still  in  its  resulting  sentiments  was  the 
failure  already  noted  of  Americans  to  distinguish 
between  the  king  and  his  group  of  reactionaries  on 

12 


THE  RUPTURE  WITH  ENGLAND 

the  one  hand,  and  the  English  people  on  the  other. 
In  the  dim  distance  all  seemed  to  the  Americans  to  be 
alike,  hostile  to  their  cause.     Indeed  they 
at  first  thought  themselves  to  be  so.    Thus  distfn"° 
all  alike  became  objects  of  our  aversion,   guished 
Yet  the  English  people  and  the  people's 
government  were  at  the  bottom  in  sympathy  with  the 
principle  for  which  we  were  fighting. 


m 


INDEPENDENCE   AND    THE    PEACE   CRISIS, 
1783 

THE  American  War  of  Independence  is  a  curious 
illustration  of  the  divided  purpose  of  England  at  this 
time.  The  king  and  his  party  of  course  urged  the 
war  strongly,  being  determined  to  compel  the  colo 
nists  to  recognize  their  authority.  It  certainly  looked 
as  if  they  could  do  so,  for  England  completely  con 
trolled  the  seas,  she  had  a  great  army  of  trained  sol 
diers  and  ample  wealth  and  military  supplies.  The 
colonists  were  few  and  poor.  Moreover  they  lacked 
arms  and  ammunition,  these  things  having  previously 
been  imported  from  Europe,  which  was  now  obviously 
impossible.  Yet  the  colonists  won  the  war  for  two 
reasons.  First,  because  the  English  people  did  not 
support  the  king  and  his  party.  Second,  because 
France  aided  them,  bringing  them  ships,  men,  and 
supplies.  Indeed  the  American  war  was  only  a  little 
episode  in  a  very  great  war  which  was  fought  in  Europe, 
in  India,  and  everywhere  where  these  two  great  powers 
found  themselves  in  contact.  Moreover  in  this  great 
war  England  won  at  every  point  except  in  America. 
England's  efforts  were  plainly  rather  half-hearted  in 
this  part  of  the  struggle.  There  was  in  fact  a  party 
in  England  all  this  time  which  maintained  that  the 
colonies  ought  to  be  independent,  and  this  was  the 

14 


INDEPENDENCE  AND   THE  PEACE   CRISIS 

real  English  party  as  opposed  to  the  little  party  of 
the  king  which  was  kept  in  power  by  bribery  of  Par 
liament. 

When  at  last  the  British  failed  at  Yorktown,  the 
king's  party  fell  from  power  and  the  party  of  the  Eng 
lish  people  came  into  control,   a  control  } 
which  they  have  never  since  lost.     This  party  will- 
party  at  once  showed  itself  ready  to  make  **&  make 

,  .      .  .        peace 

peace  and  to  recognize  the  colonies  as  in 
dependent  states.  Had  the  English  public  been  agreed, 
as  in  the  conflict  with  Napoleon  or  in  the  present  war 
with  Germany,  that  the  war  must  be  fought  through 
to  victory,  no  matter  at  what  cost,  there  can  be  no 
doubt  that  England  could  have  done  so.  But  this 
party  —  the  party  of  the  English  people  —  did  not 
believe  this,  and  hence  they  offered  peace,  not 
grudgingly  but  willingly  and  on  extremely  favorable 
terms. 

But  the  attitude  of  England  was  most  clearly  mani 
fested  in  another  connection.     It  must  be  remembered 

that  we  were  allies  of  France  and  had  made 

.  ,       Difficul- 

the  usual  agreement  to  make  peace  only   ties  with 

in    common    with    our    ally.     Spain,    too,   France  and 

of)  Am 

though  not  formally  our  ally,  was  at  war 

with  England  at  the  time.  It  soon  developed  that 
our  relations  with  these  nations  involved  grave 
problems.  It  is  an  amazing  fact  that  England, 
even  at  this  moment  of  rebellion  against  her 
authority,  took  our  side  and  saved  us  from  the 
gravest  dangers. 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


France  had  designs  of  her  own  which  we  did  not 

suspect  until  the   time  came   to   make  peace.    The 

Americans  demanded  that  England  should 

France  .  .11  ,.         i 

schemes  negotiate  with  them  directly  as  an  m- 
against  in-  dependent  power,  for  they  had  main 
tained  from  the  first  that  they  had  always 
been  independent.  The  French  minister  thought  this 
very  unreasonable.  He  said  that  when  the  treaty  was 
concluded,  it  would  make  them  independent  and  that 
they  should  be  satisfied  with  that.  This  may  seem 
to  be  a  very  little  point,  but  it  actually  made  a  very 
great  difference.  If  the  Americans  were  not  inde 
pendent  until  the  treaty  was  concluded,  then  they 
could  not  treat  directly  with1  Britain  at  all,  for  only 
independent  nations  can  make  treaties  together. 
France  would  thus  have  been  the  leader  in  conducting 
the  negotiations  and  would  be  in  a  position  largely 
to  determine  the  terms  of  the  treaty.  This  was  what 
the  French  minister  wanted.  It  soon  developed  that 
he  did  not  intend  the  colonies  to  be  really  independent 
even  after  the  treaty.  It  was  even  suggested  that 
we  should  not  ask  England  to  recognize  our  independ 
ence  but  should  ask  France  to  guarantee  our  inde 
pendence.  It  is  evident  that  if  our  independence 
rested  only  upon  the  guarantee  of  France,  we  might 
be  independent  of  all  other  nations  but  we  would  be 
dependent  upon  France.  This  was  precisely  what 
France  desired.  She  had  aimed  to  control  North 
America  and  in  her  long  wars  with  England  she  had 
lost  everything.  Now  she  hoped,  with  the  aid  of  the 

16 


INDEPENDENCE   AND   THE   PEACE   CRISIS 

colonists,  to  regain,  in  a  different  way,  the  ground  she 
had  lost.  So  she  held  off  about  negotiating  until  the 
Americans  should  recognize  their  helplessness  and  put 
themselves  in  her  hands.  There  was  nothing  pecul 
iarly  reprehensible  in  this  attitude  of  France  as  such 
matters  were  then  judged.  She  had  no  reason  to 
favor  these  colonists  who  were  not  of  her  race  and  who 
had  done  as  much  as  England  herself  had  done  to 
defeat  French  purposes  in  the  New  World.  If  she 
could,  by  diplomatic  manipulation,  recover  a  place  of 
which  she  believed  herself  to  have  been  unjustly  de 
prived,  she  saw  no  reason  why  she  should  not  do  so. 
It  must  be  remembered,  too,  that  this  was  not  the  free 
France  of  to-day,  but  the  France  of  the  ancien  regime, 
whose  government,  not  in  the  least  representative  of 
the  people,  was  soon  to  go  down  in  ruin. 

As  the  Americans  gradually  perceived  this  purpose 
of  France  they  became  greatly  alarmed.     They  were 
wholly  at  the  mercy  of  France  unless  they 
could  find  a  powerful  ally  against  her.     It  helps  us  to 


was  England  that  came  to  their  rescue, 

.,.  -11  France 

brie  consented  at  once  to  treat  with  them 

as  an  independent  nation.  The  negotiation  was  most 
difficult,  for  it  had  to  be  conducted  clandestinely, 
eluding  the  vigilance  of  French  spies,  but  it  was  ac 
complished,  and  a  treaty  was  drawn  up  covering  all 
points  at  issue  between  them.  England  conceded  not 
only  our  claim  of  independence  but  much  else  in  the 
way  of  valuable  privilege.  The  terms  were  such  as 
to  amaze  the  governments  of  France  and  Spain, 
c  17 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


who  were  dumbfounded  to  see  England  acting  practi 
cally  as  the  ally  of  America  and  scheming  for  her 
advantage. 

The  treaty  thus  drawn  up  and  prepared  for  signa 
ture  was  laid  before  the  French  minister  (for  it  must 
be  remembered  that  we  had  promised  to  make  peace 
only  in  conjunction  with  France),  and  he  was  asked 
to  sign  it  with  us.  Thus  we  kept  the  letter  of  our 
agreement,  but  we  plainly  evaded  its  spirit,  for  what 
France  wanted  was  that  we  should  negotiate  the  treaty 
together,  not  merely  sign  it  together.  The  justifica 
tion  for  this  evasion  must  be  sought  in  the  fact  that 
France  had  proven  herself  plainly  disloyal  to  the 
spirit  of  the  agreement.  The  French  minister  was 
exceedingly  angry,  but  he  finally  realized  that  he  had 
been  caught  napping  and  that  there  was  no  further 
chance  for  the  manipulations  upon  which  he  had 
counted.  He  therefore  signed  the  treaty,  but  yielded 
with  bad  grace. 

Our  relation  to  Spain  was  much  less  vital,  but  it 
was  hardly  less  significant.  Spain  had  settled  Florida, 
but  had  recently  surrendered  it  to  Britain  in  exchange 
for  Havana.  It  of  course  did  not  take  the  part  of  the 
colonies  in  the  war  and  was  not  included  in  the  treaty 
of  independence.  It  was  anticipated,  however,  that 
when  Britain  made  peace  with  Spain  the  whole  problem 
of  their  vast  colonial  possessions  would  be  taken  up  and 
that  exchanges  would  probably  be  made.  Now  that 
Britain  had  lost  the  colonies,  Florida  with  its  Spanish 
population  had  lost  much  of  its  former  value  and  would 

18 


INDEPENDENCE  AND   THE   PEACE   CRISIS 

very  likely  be  given  to  Spain  in  exchange  for  some 
thing  more  valuable  to  England. 

There  was  a  tract  of  land  known  as  the  Yazoo  Lands 
constituting  the  northern  part  of  the  present  states 

of  Mississippi  and  Alabama,  which  did  not  „ 

The  Yazoo 
belong  originally  either  to  Florida  (which   Lands; 

then  extended  west  to  the  Mississippi)  or  to  *^e  secret 
any  of  the  British  colonies.  When  England 
acquired  Florida,  this  no-man's-land,  which  required 
some  attention,  was  brought  under  the  adminis 
trative  control  of  Florida.  As  none  of  the  thirteen 
colonies  claimed  it,  it  would  seem  natural  that  it 
should  stay  there,  and  such  was  England's  deter 
mination  if  she  retained  Florida.  But  if  Florida 
were  to  be  returned  to  Spain,  she  was  not  minded  to 
make  it  any  larger  than  was  necessary.  Hence  a 
secret  agreement  was  included  in  the  treaty  (it  was 
not  shown  to  the  French  minister)  that  if  Florida  re 
mained  British,  its  northern  boundary  should  be 
latitude  32°  30';  but  if  Florida  became  Spanish,  its 
northern  boundary  should  be  31°.  We  need  not  here 
discuss  the  legitimacy  of  such  a  secret  agreement  nor 
the  disputes  to  which  it  afterward  gave  rise.  It  con 
cerns  us  merely  to  note  the  attitude  of  England  toward 
this  new  American  nation  which  she  had  just  rescued 
from  France  and  set  upon  its  feet.  She  said  in  effect 
by  this  agreement :  "If  Florida  is  to  be  ours,  we  want 
this  unappropriated  strip,  but  if  Florida  is  to  be  Spanish, 
we  want  you  to  have  it,  even  though  you  have  never 
had  any  claim  to  it," 

19 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


Thus  the  English  people,  having  overthrown  the 
government  which  challenged  their  liberties  and  ours, 
The  English  not  on^  recognized  our  independence,  but 
people  early  saved  us  in  the  first  great  crisis  of  our  na- 
our  friends  tiona]  ijfe  ancj  even  conspired  to  extend  our 

territory  at  the  expense  of  unfriendly  neighbors. 


IV 

AMERICA    AND    THE    NAPOLEONIC    CRISIS, 
1812-1815 

THE  first  years  of  our  national  life  were  years  of 
unprecedented  commotion  in  Europe.  France,  in  the 
throes  of  revolution  and  later  in  war  with  all  Europe, 
counted  somewhat  overconfidently  on  our  aid  if  not 
our  open  alliance.  It  was  plain  that  she  had  not  by 
any  means  learned  the  lesson  of  the  peace  treaty. 
The  great  wisdom  of  Washington  saved  us  from  in 
curring  the  obligations  and  the  enmities  which  at  that 
stage  of  development  might  have  been  fatal.  The 
tradition  of  French  friendship,  however,  which  had 
followed  the  war  was  pretty  effectually  shattered. 
The  change  is  perhaps  best  indicated  by  the  attitude  of 
Jefferson,  who  began  his  political  career  as  an  ardent 
friend  of  France  and  bitter  enemy  of  England,  but 
closed  it,  after  eight  years  in  the  president's  office, 
as  a  strong  advocate  of  friendship  with  England. 

But  with  the  rise  of  Napoleon  the  European  situa 
tion  became  desperate  and  drove  the  contestants  to 
unheard-of  expedients.       Napoleon     had  England  is 
brought  all  the  continent  under  his  rule  and   p*essed  by 
only  England  stood  at  bay.    At  Boulogne,  Napoleon 
where  the  emperor  had  gathered  his  huge  army  for 
the  invasion  of  England,  he  looked  across,  as  Caesar 
had  done,  to  the  white  cliffs  of  Dover  and  waited 
impatiently  for  news  that  his  fleet  had  overcome  the 

21 


AMERICA  AND  BRITAIN 


watchful  British  navy  that  kept  him  from  his  prey. 
That  news  never  came.  Down  close  by  Gibraltar 
the  British  fleet  met  the  great  fleet  of  Napoleon  and 
broke  its  power  forever.  There  is  something  inspiring 
in  that  simple  message  that  Nelson  flew  from  his  mast 
head  that  night  at  Trafalgar,  a  message  so  different 
from  the  bombastic  speeches  of  the  emperor:  " Eng 
land  expects  every  man  to  do  his  duty."  The  duty 
was  done  and  England  was  saved.  And  not  Eng 
land  only.  It  is  easier  now  than  it  was  then  to  see 
what  was  at  stake  in  the  titanic  contest.  Had  Eng 
land  been  conquered  Napoleon  would  have  been  the 
undisputed  master  of  Europe.  And  the  mastery  of 
Europe  in  that  day,  perhaps  in  any  day,  cannot  but 
mean  the  mastery  of  America  and  of  the  world.  Does 
any  one  doubt  as  to  what  would  be  the  fate  of  America 
to-day  if  a  single  power  should  get  control  of  Europe? 
Of  all  this  we  were  then  unconscious.  Napoleon's 
career  might  interest  us  but  it  did  not  in  the  least 
concern  us.  We  read  of  it,  —  what  little  there  was 
to  read,  —  much  as  we  now  read  of  the  exploits  of  a 
rebel  general  hi  China.  Napoleon  had  a  very  dif 
ferent  idea  as  to  the  relation  of  his  plans  to  ourselves, 
but  we  knew  nothing  of  his  ideas,  and  had  we  known 
them,  they  would  probably  have  influenced  us  but 
little. 

But  England  touched  us  where  we  were  sensitive. 
She  maintained  the  great  fleet  which  saved  her  and 
the  liberties  of  the  world,  only  by  the  most  strenuous 
effort.  Her  population  was  much  less  than  now  and 

22 


AMERICA  AND   THE  NAPOLEONIC   CRISIS 

her  supply  of  seamen  scarcely  sufficient.     Discipline 
was  harsh  and  the  hardships  of  the  service  very  great. 
Unfortunately  patriotism  was  at  low  ebb,   Desertion 
not  only  in  England  but  the  world  over,   of  English 
It  is  said   that  in  the  war  that  followed  Seamen 
our  own  country  drafted  four  hundred  thousand  men, 
yet  never  succeeded  in  getting  more  than  six  thousand 
under  arms  at  any  one  time.     England  met  similar 
difficulties.     Desertions  of  seamen  were  common.     Ob 
viously  the  most  practicable  thing  for  a  deserter  to  do 
was  to  ship   aboard  an   American   vessel,  where  he 
stood  a  pretty  good  chance  of  passing  himself  off  as  an 
American.    And  since  England  had  technically  no  right 
to  search  our  ships,  the  chance  of  escape  seemed  good. 

But  England  simply  had  to  have  her  seamen.  If 
for  one  moment  the  fleet  failed  in  its  great  task,  every 
thing  that  England  was  and  stood  for  would  perish. 
Her  moral  claim  to  the  surrender  of  these  deserters 
was  a  pretty  strong  one,  and  if  we  enlisted  them 
knowingly,  we  were  assuredly  at  fault.  So  in  defiance 
of  precedent  England  boarded  our  ships  and  took  her 
seamen  where  she  found  them.  In  case  of  doubt,  she 
gave  herself  the  benefit  of  the  doubt.  She  certainly 
sometimes  took  American  citizens,  perhaps  even  in 
some  cases  took  them  knowingly. 

This  boarding  of  our  ships  and  impressment  of  our 
seamen  incensed  us.     We    did    not    take  A^^ 
account  of  England's  desperate  situation  resents 
or  of  our  interest  in  the  battle  she  was  seizures 
waging.    These  were  nothing  to  us.    Nor  do  we  seem  to 

23 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


have  considered  the  question  of  our  right  to  admit 
deserters  to  our  service.  The  outrage  angered  us  and 
we  declared  war.  It  is  doubtful  if  any  nation  to-day 
would  declare  war  under  such  circumstances  unless 
looking  for  a  pretext.  There  would  be  protests, 
diplomatic  exchanges,  mutual  concessions  and  pre 
cautions,  and  finally  reparation  for  any  injuries  in 
flicted.  But  we  were  young  and  had  the  limitations 
of  youth. 

In  the  war  that  followed  there  were  a  number  of 
brilliant  naval  engagements  in  which  our  ships  dem- 
Indecisive  onstrated,  much  to  England's  surprise, 
naval  vie-  their  superior  sailing  and  fighting  qualities. 
England  had  been  too  busy  in  these  years 
of  warfare  to  study  the  art  of  ship  building  and  make 
improvements  as  we  had  been  free  to  do.  Hence  we 
won  some  brilliant  victories,  of  which  we  have  perhaps 
been  inclined  to  make  too  much  account.  But  none 
of  these  victories  gave  us  command  of  the  sea  or  con 
tributed  appreciably  to  the  winning  of  the  war.  Mean 
while  on  land  our  record  was  inglorious.  The  only 
battle  which  ended  in  victory  for  the  American  arms 
was  the  battle  of  New  Orleans  fought  after  peace  had 
been  signed,  while  the  enemy  ravaged  our  country 
and  burned  our  capitol.  The  impression  is  prevalent 
in  America  that  we  were  victorious  in  this  war,  an 
impressiori  to  which  English  apathy  in  the  conduct  of 
the  war  and  the  favorable  terms  of  peace  which  we 
secured  lend  a  certain  color.  But  if  the  Allies  in  the 
present  war  should  make  peace  with  Germany  after 

24 


AMERICA  AND   THE   NAPOLEONIC    CRISIS 

occupying  Berlin  and  burning  the  emperor's  palace, 
we  should  hardly  count  it  a  German  victory.  It  was 
under  such  circumstances  that  England  made  peace 
with  us. 

And  now  again  we  have  to  note  a  very  remarkable 
treaty  of  peace.  There  could  be  no  question  that 
England  had  us  in  her  power.  It  was  freely  Favorable 
surmised  that  she  would  now  reestablish  terms  of 
her  authority  over  us.  A  power  like  France  peace 
or  Germany  would  certainly  have  done  so.  But  Eng 
land  had  espoused  the  cause  of  liberty  and  independ 
ence  and  was  about  to  carry  it  farther  rather  than  to 
curtail  it.  So  the  treaty  merely  stipulated  that  each 
should  surrender  all  territory,  prisoners,  and  property 
taken  from  the  other,  —  a  very  one-sided  provision 
when  we  consider  that  America  had  taken  virtually 
nothing.  The  only  other  positive  article  which  it  is 
important  to  recall  is  a  pledge  of  cooperation  in  sup 
pressing  the  African  slave  trade,  a  provision  strangely 
irrelevant  to  the  struggle  in  question,  but  profoundly 
significant  of  the  deeper  currents  of  the  national  life 
of  each.  The  issue  over  which  the  war  was  begun 
was  not  mentioned.  England  did  not  wish  the  right 
of  search  save  in  the  supreme  emergency  which  had 
passed.  She  has  never  claimed  it  since.  On  the  other 
hand  we  were  in  no  position  to  ask  her  to  renounce 
the  privilege.  It  was  an  issue  that  had  died. 

This  we  may  regard  as  the  second  great  crisis  of 
our  national  life  in  its  relation  to  other  powers.  It 
was  a  crisis  which  we  did  not  create  but  which  we 

25 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


precipitated  and  aggravated  by  our  failure  to  recog 
nize  the  significance  of  the  European  situation  and 
We  pass  our  our  re^usa^  to  m&ke  the  fullest  use  of 
second  diplomatic  means  of  settlement.  At  the  close 

of  this  crisis  England  was  the  most  powerful 
nation  in  the  world,  her  great  enemy  having  seemingly 
been  permanently  disposed  of.  Despite  our  scant 
claim  to  her  consideration,  she  was  considerate,  even 
magnanimous.  Once  more  she  had  saved  us  to  in 
dependence  and  to  Anglo-Saxon  liberty. 


26 


THE  CRISIS  OF  THE  BOUNDARIES,  1815-1848 

FOR  the  next  thirty  years  our  country  remained  at 
peace  save  for  Indian  wars  which  were  but  minor 
incidents  of  our  growth.  Yet  minor  crises  were  not 
wanting,  and  with  England  among  others. 

In  the  treaty  of  independence  an  honest  attempt 
had  been  made  to  establish  a  natural  boundary  be 
tween  Maine  and  the  adjacent  British  pos-  The  Maine 
sessions,  but  the  watersheds  designated  for  boundary 
that  purpose  were  unknown  and  proved  less  dispute 
definite  than  had  been  expected.  The  result  was  a 
disputed  territory  of  over  twelve  thousand  square 
miles.  Maine  claimed  it  all  of  course,  and  New  Bruns 
wick  was  equally  enterprising.  When  persuasion  failed 
to  establish  extreme  claims  (there  seems  to  have  been 
no  hint  of  compromise) ,  Maine  decided  to  take  military 
possession  and  voted  men  and  money  for  the  purpose. 
This  preposterous  move  was  promptly  matched  by 
New  Brunswick.  It  was  plainly  a  case  for  the  soberer 
powers  behind  to  call  down  these  presumptuous 
youngsters  of  the  frontier.  But  one  of  these  powers 
did  not  see  it  that  way.  Our  Congress  approved  the 
action  of  Maine  and  voted  further  men  and  supplies. 

But  England  took  a  different  course.  It  was  pro 
posed  to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration  and  the 
King  of  the  Netherlands  was  chosen  as  referee.  After 
painstaking  investigation  he  rendered  a  decision  which 

27 


AMERICA   AND    BRITAIN 


gave  us  about  three  fifths  of  the  disputed  territory 
and  New  Brunswick  two  fifths.  This  award  was  re- 
England  jected  by  our  minister  to  the  Netherlands 
proposes  without  even  submitting  it  to  his  govern 
ment,  a  procedure  which  would  seem 
ingly  have  called  for  a  reprimand  from  Washington. 
On  the  contrary  his  action  was  approved,  apparently 
for  no  other  reason  than  that  the  award  did  not  give 
us  all  that  we  claimed.  Thus  began  our  experience 
with  arbitration.  The  matter  remained  for  some  time 
unsettled  but  was  finally  closed  by  a  treaty  negotiated 
by  large-minded  representatives  of  both  sides.  We 
got  about  the  amount  that  the  award  had  given  us, 
but  somewhat  differently  located.  There  was  much 
dissatisfaction,  for  we  had  not  yet  learned  the  neces 
sity  of  compromise,  but  Webster,  our  representative, 
consoled  us  by  saying  that  we  had  gotten  the  good 
land  and  New  Brunswick  the  mountains.  The  matter 
is  so  small  a  one  that  it  is  now  well-nigh  forgotten, 
but  it  gives  us  pause  to  think  what  might  have  hap 
pened,  had  England  been  unfriendly  toward  us. 

A  much  larger  question  was  that  of  Oregon,  which 
made  trouble  for  more  than  thirty  years.  Spain 
The  Oregon  (later,  Mexico)  owned  the  western  coast  to 
controversy  the  northern  boundary  of  California.  Rus 
sia  owned  Alaska.  All  the  country  between  was 
known  as  Oregon.  We  claimed  it  all,  and  were  deter 
mined  to  give  England  no  access  to  the  Pacific.  Eng 
land,  though  asserting  that  she  might  just  as  fairly 
claim  it  all  as  we  did,  never  did  so,  but  she  greatly 

28 


THE   CRISIS   OF  THE   BOUNDARIES 

desired  to  have  the  Columbia  River  as  the  boundary, 
as  that  was  the  only  means  of  inland  communication. 
She  urged  her  claim  on  the  ground  of  its  inherent  rea 
sonableness,  while  we  based  ours  on  discovery*  and 
exploration,  in  which,  however,  her  claims  pretty 
nearly  matched  ours.  When  agreement  seemed  im 
possible  England  suggested  a  ten  years'  truce  until 
we  could  see  how  the  country  settled  up.  This  was 
agreed  to,  and  then  another  ten  years  following  it, 
both  parties  meanwhile  clinging  tenaciously  to  their 
claims.  England  felt  that  she  could  not  surrender 
all  outlet  to  the  Pacific  or  her  right  to  navigate  the 
great  river.  She  was  willing  to  grant  us  the  same. 
But  we  claimed  all  the  coast  and  the  exclusive  navi 
gation  of  the  river.  It  was  impossible  to  make  this 
extreme  claim  seem  reasonable  to  the  English  people, 
and  as  we  pushed  our  claim  unsparingly,  relations  be 
came  for  a  time  somewhat  strained.  An  American 
presidential  campai^.i  was  waged  and  a  candidate 
elected  on  the  slogan:  " Fifty-four  forty  or  fight," 
which  meant  that  the  candidate  (Polk)  pledged  him 
self,  if  elected,  to  secure  all  of  Oregon  up  to  latitude 
fifty-four  degrees  and  forty  minutes  (the  Alaskan 
boundary)  or  go  to  war  for  it.  It  is  true  that  when 
elected  he  did  nothing  of  the  kind,  but  England  could 
hardly  know  that  at  the  time,  and  this  virtual  threat 
of  the  American  people  to  go  to  war  to  enforce  what 
seemed  to  Englishmen  to  be  a  wholly  unreasonable 
claim  put  their  patience  to  a  severe  test. 
In  view  of  these  facts  their  action  was  significant. 
29 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


Instead  of  threatening  us  in  return  or  sending  a  mili 
tary  force  to  occupy  the  disputed  territory,  they  sent 
Britain's  an  a&ent  to  ascertain  how  many  settlers  of 
special  each  nation  were  located  there  and  which 
inquiry  government  they  preferred.  He  found 
that  Americans  greatly  predominated  on  both  sides  of 
the  Columbia  River  and  that  they  preferred  their  own 
government.  His  report  was  published,  and  as  the 
facts  became  known  to  the  English  people,  their 
indignation  at  American  high-handed  procedure  was 
so  far  allayed  that  the  government  was  able  to  propose 
the  present  boundary,  which  was  accepted.  England 
thus  lost  the  navigation  of  the  Columbia,  which  she 
had  deemed  indispensable,  but  Canada  was  not  de 
prived  of  her  outlet  to  the  Pacific. 

The  English  conviction  that  Americans  were  un 
reasonable  in  their  claims  was  not  without  its  unfor 
tunate  reactions.  There  was  a  marked  dis- 
Bntain  op 
poses  ex-  position  for  a  time  to  retaliate  and  to  resist 
pansion  American  expansion.  When  Texas  was 
about  to  enter  the  Union,  both  England  and  France 
used  their  influence  against  it,  offering  to  guarantee 
her  independence  against  Mexico  on  condition  that 
she  should  not  enter  the  American  union.  As  this 
was  about  the  period  of  "fifty-four  forty  or  fight," 
we  may  safely  attribute  England's  action  in  part  to 
resentment.  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  Texas, 
after  achieving  her  independence  from  Mexico,  had 
adopted  a  constitution  prohibiting  slavery,  and  that 
the  proposal  now  was  to  admit  her  to  the  Union  as  a 

30 


THE   CRISIS  OF  THE   BOUNDARIES 

slave  state,  a  proposal  intensely  repugnant  to  English 
sentiment  as  also  to  the  best  sentiment  of  our  own 
people.  It  is  questionable  whether  this  brief  attitude 
of  opposition  is  to  be  chiefly  attributed  to  resentment 
or  to  magnanimity. 

A  dispute  regarding  the  proposed  Nicaragua  Canal 
at  this  time  also  felt  the  influence  of  the  Oregon  con 
troversy,  and  again,  in  its  final  settle-  The  Q 
ment,  disclosed  the  persistent  attitude  of  ton-Bulwer 
the  English  people.  England  was  gradu-  reaty 
ally  acquiring  control  of  territories  in  Central  America 
which  would  give  her  control  of  such  a  canal  when 
built.  We  did  not  wish  the  canal  to  be  under  her 
control,  though  at  that  time  we  had  no  thought  of  hav 
ing  it  under  our  own.  We  began  by  objecting  to  the 
occupation  of  these  territories.  But  this  occupation 
rested  on  settlements  and  commercial  relations,  some 
of  them  of  long  standing,  and  England  naturally 
stood  her  ground.  Then  we  took  up  the  canal  project 
as  such,  and  England  agreed,  in  the  famous  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  that  the  canal  should  be  built  and  con 
trolled  by  the  two  nations  in  common,  and  accepted  a 
limitation  of  her  territorial  possessions  in  the  vicinity. 
These  limitations  were  vaguely  defined  and  led  to 
disputes  in  which  England  was  the  less  reasonable 
party.  Ultimately  she  yielded  a  considerable  part 
of  the  disputed  claims.  Taken  as  a  whole,  we  must 
again  characterize  her  attitude  as  conciliatory. 

It  is  perhaps   appropriate   to   anticipate   here   the 
sequel  of  this  story  which  came  half  a  century  later. 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


Slowly  the  opinion  developed  in  America  that  the 
canal  should  be  our  own.  When  it  became  clear  that 

Britain's  ^s  was  ^°  ^e  ^e  Permanent  judgment  of 
voluntary  the  American  people,  we  asked  England  to 
concession  releage  ug  frQm  ^  pledge  of  ^  Clayton. 

Bulwer  treaty.  This  she  promptly  did,  asking  only 
that  we  carry  out  the  other  provisions  of  the  treaty, 
to  leave  the  canal  unfortified  and  open  to  the  use  of 
all  nations  on  equal  terms.  John  Hay  reported  this 
agreement  with  much  satisfaction,  only  to  meet  with 
rebuff.  It  was  justly  objected  that  if  we  were  to 
build  and  control  the  canal,  we  must  be  free  to  fortify 
it.  Again  he  turned  to  England  and  asked  the  further 
concession  and  again  the  request  was  granted  without 
a  moment's  hesitation.  But  this  was  at  a  later  day, 
when  Oregon  was  a  fading  memory. 

The  attitude  of  England  during  this  period  of  minor 
crises  was  neither  altruistic  nor  timid.  It  was  charac- 
Engiand's  terized  throughout  by  that  keen  regard  for 
wise  self-  British  interests  which  has  ever  marked  the 
action  of  that  enterprising  people.  There 
has  been  no  romantic  knight-errantry  in  British  policy. 
Nor  will  any  one  familiar  with  the  facts  construe  her 
concessions  as  due  to  fear.  Never  before  or  since  was 
her  power  so  great  relative  to  that  of  other  nations. 
Never  did  she  have  so  free  a  hand.  It  is  beyond  doubt 
that  she  could  have  forced  a  more  favorable  settlement 
of  the  Maine  and  Oregon  boundary  disputes  had  she 
chosen  to  do  so.  She  did  not  choose.  Possibly  her 
wiser  statesmen  looked  forward  to  a  time  when  a 

32 


THE  CRISIS   OF  THE   BOUNDARIES 

strong  America  might  stand  her  in  good  stead,  but  the 
English  people,  whose  clearly  expressed  will  determined 
British  policy,  can  hardly  have  been  so  far-seeing.  It 
is  to  the  simpler  virtues  of  fairness  and  the  deeply  im 
planted  spirit  of  liberty  that  we  must  attribute  their 
dominant  attitude.  If  the  Oregon  settlers  were  mostly 
American  and  preferred  American  government,  it  was 
repugnant  to  English  principles  and  to  English  instincts 
to  deny  them  the  Anglo-Saxon  privilege.  In  familiar 
parlance  perhaps  we  may  say,  the  Englishman  is  a  true 
sportsman.  He  detests  the  unsportsmanlike  thing,  at 
least  among  his  peers.  That  he  does  not  feel  quite  the 
same  toward  other  races  is  not  strange.  They  are  not 
his  race  nor  usually  the  equals  of  his  race.  He  goes 
by  facts,  not  by  theories. 


33 


VI 

THE  CRISIS  OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR,  1861-1865 

OUR  Civil  War  brought  a  crisis  in  our  relations  with 
England.  Nothing  in  her  relation  to  us  has  been  so 
much  resented  and  possibly  nothing  so  misunderstood 
as  her  action  at  this  time.  If,  as  the  foregoing  narra 
tive  seems  to  warrant,  the  attitude  of  England  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  was  one  of  moderate  friendliness, 
the  situation  was  not  the  less  an  embarrassing  one. 
Both  sides  were  American,  and  in  so  far  both  might 
claim  English  friendship.  In  their  differences  also 
each  could  appeal  to  English  sympathy.  The  southern 
states  were  fighting  for  independence,  a  principle 
which  had  taken  a  very  deep  hold  on  English  thought. 
The  northern  states  were  fighting,  really  if  not  avow 
edly,  for  human  liberty  and  the  abolition  of  slavery, 
a  cause  to  which  England  was  irrevocably  committed. 
What  the  line-up  would  have  been  if  England  had  been 
an  unconcerned  onlooker  it  is  difficult  to  say. 

But  England  was  very  much  concerned.  One  of 
the  most  important  of  her  industries  was  the  manu- 
The  English  ^acture  of  cotton,  an  industry  in  which 
cotton  whole  cities  and  districts  were  almost  ex 

clusively  engaged.  But  England  herself 
raises  no  cotton,  and  at  that  time  her  whole  supply 
came  from  the  southern  states.  It  was  a  part  of  our 
military  policy  to  blockade  the  southern  ports  and 
prevent  both  export  and  import.  This  deprived  the 

34 


THE   CRISIS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

English  manufacturers  of  cotton  and  brought  their 
industry  to  a  standstill.  Thousands  of  operatives 
were  thrown  out  of  employment  and  brought  to  the 
verge  of  starvation.  Discontent  was  widespread  and 
sentiment  naturally  inclined  toward  the  South. 

The  situation  was  much  aggravated  by  our  action 
in  boarding  an  English  vessel  and  taking  off  two  rep 
resentatives  which  the  South  was  sending  We  seize 
to  England.  This  was  precisely  what  we  confederate 
had  gone  to  war  about  in  1812.  In  a  way  agents 
it  was  much  worse,  for  England  had  boarded  our  ships 
in  search  of  deserters,  while  we  had  taken  two  men  who 
had  pretty  nearly  the  character  of  diplomatic  represent 
atives,  who  enjoy  immunity  from  seizure  in  all  civi 
lized  nations.  We  were  palpably  in  the  wrong,  as  we 
soon  realized,  surrendering  the  two  representatives 
with  due  apologies  in  response  to  England's  peremp 
tory  demand.  This  averted  the  worst  results,  but 
it  did  not  altogether  remove  the  irritation  which  our 
action  had  caused. 

No  government  worthy  of  the  name  will  see  its 
people  hunger  without  trying  to  relieve  their  suffering. 
The  British  government  scanned  the  situa-  Britain 
tion  closely  and  questioned  our  procedure  resists 
at  every  doubtful  point,  seeking  if  possible  blockade 
to  open  our  blockade.     The  laws  governing  blockade 
were  far  from  definite,  and  disagreements  were  nu 
merous.     Much  turned  on  the  question  of  the  status 
of  the  Confederacy  as  a  nation  and  as  a  belligerent, 
a  question  which  neutral  nations  were  free  to  decide 

35 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


at  their  discretion,  little  hampered  by  definite  rules  or 
fixed  precedents.  Naturally  such  decisions  were 
likely  to  be  much  influenced  by  their  interests,  and 
England  had  the  most  obvious  motives  for  deciding 
in  favor  of  the  Confederacy. 

In  this  emergency  we  appealed  to  the  English 
people.  The  eloquent  Henry  Ward  Beecher  was  sent 
We  appeal  to  England  to  present  the  cause  of  the 
to  the  Eng-  Union.  Landing  at  Liverpool,  he  pro- 
Ush  people  ceec[ed  at  once  to  the  disaffected  districts 
of  the  cotton  industry.  His  first  audience  was  sullen 
and  discourteous.  But  taking  the  disturbances  good- 
humoredly,  he  soon  provoked  a  laugh,  and  taking  ad 
vantage  of  this  momentary  favor,  he  launched  out 
into  an  eloquent  appeal  for  the  cause  of  human  free 
dom.  There  was  attention,  then  applause,  and  finally 
an  ovation.  He  was  passed  on  to  the  next  town  and 
the  next,  until  his  progress  to  London  became  almost 
a  triumphal  procession.  Then  came  perhaps  the  most 
astonishing  fact  in  the  history  of  this  or  any  other 
people.  A  petition  was  circulated  in  these  same  in 
dustrial  cities  whose  livelihood  had  been  cut  off  by 
our  blockade,  praying  the  British  government  not  to 
take  the  part  of  a  government  based  on  human  slavery. 
The  prayer  was  heeded  and  the  contemplated  aid 
was  not  given.  As  a  result  the  blockade  was  continued 
and  the  cause  of  the  Union  prevailed.  Much  has  been 
said  of  the  momentary  defection  of  Mr.  Gladstone 
and  his  colleagues  from  the  high  cause  of  human 
liberty  to  which  they  professed  allegiance,  but  little 

36 


THE   CRISIS   OF  THE   CIVIL  WAR 

is  known  of  the  deliberate  choice  of  the  English  people 
at  that  time  to  suffer  hunger  and  loss  for  our  cause. 
Whatever  the  wisdom  of  their  decision,  there  can  be 
no  doubt  of  its  heroic  disinterestedness.  A  petition 
is  a  very  undramatic  thing,  and  it  easily  escapes  at 
tention,  but  this  one  must  be  counted  among  the  great 
forces  that  contributed  to  the  preservation  of  the  Union 
in  a  moment  of  extreme  peril. 

But  while  few  have  heard  of  this  act  of  popular 
sympathy,  all  have  heard  of  the  Alabama,  that  famous 
sea-rider  that  for  so  long  terrorized  the  high  The  Ala_ 
seas.  To  the  popular  mind  the  exploits  of  bama  dep- 
this  modern  buccaneer  are  the  real  index  of  redations 
British  sympathies  during  the  war.  This  ship,  to 
gether  with  a  number  of  others,  was  fitted  out  in  a 
British  shipyard  to  raid  our  commerce.  She  was  built 
on  private  contract  like  any  other  ship,  and  neither 
the  British  government  nor  the  English  people  knew 
anything  about  it.  The  American  consul  at  Liver 
pool  found  out  about  it,  and  the  British  government 
was  asked  to  prevent  its  sailing.  This  it  consented 
to  do,  but  the  action  involved  formalities  and  delay, 
and  the  ship  got  away  a  few  hours  before  the  decisive 
action  was  attempted.  Probably  there  were  Americans 
at  the  time  who  thought  the  government  connived  at 
this  escape,  but  no  such  charge  was  ever  proved  or 
even  alleged.  Certainly  those  who  are  familiar  with 
the  red  tape  of  our  own  government  will  not  find  it 
difficult  to  account  for  the  delay.  After  the  war 
England  willingly  consented  to  refer  the  matter  to  ar- 

37 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


bitration,  and  she  paid  promptly  the  damages  which 
the  commission  assessed,  though  she  regarded  the  award 
as  excessive,  as  our  later  settlement  with  the  individual 
losers  seemed  also  to  demonstrate.  The  only  part 
which  the  British  government  and  the  English  people 
had  in  this  deplorable  transaction  was  carelessness 
in  permitting  the  abuse  of  their  neutrality  and  prompt 
ness  in  paying  the  damages  thus  unwittingly  incurred. 

Britain  was  peculiarly  unfortunate  in  this  crisis 
in  our  national  affairs.  She  was  neither  unfriendly  to 
Britain's  America  nor  yet  to  the  Union  cause.  In 
disadvan-  the  end  she  was  strikingly  favorable,  and 
that  under  extreme  difficulties.  But  her 
sympathy  was  necessarily  expressed  only  by  for 
bearance  and  in  negative  ways,  while  injuries  inflicted 
by  individual  citizens  without  her  warrant  were  of  a 
nature  to  powerfully  impress  the  imagination.  The 
British  government  and  people,  at  the  moment  of 
their  greatest  disinterestedness,  suffered  as  never  be 
fore  in  the  opinion  of  Americans.  It  was  long  before 
the  misunderstandings  of  this  period  were  finally  re 
moved. 


VII 

THE  CRISIS  OF  ARBITRATION,   1881-1899 

THE  period  of  peace  between  the  Civil  War  and  the 
War  with  Spain  was  not  marked  by  any  of  those 
dramatic  events  which  appeal  to  the  imagination.  It 
was  none  the  less  a  period  of  real  crises  and  one  which 
at  one  time  subjected  the  friendship  between  the  two 
countries  to  a  severe  strain.  The  striking  event  of 
the  period  was  a  demand  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States,  enforced  by  a  virtual  threat  of  war,  that  Brit 
ain  should  submit  to  arbitration  her  claim,  not  against 
ourselves,  but  against  another  country.  It  was  the 
extraordinary  nature  of  this  demand  rather  than  the 
character  of  the  claim  itself,  which  constituted  the 
great  issue  of  the  period.  This  we  may  appropriately 
call  the  crisis  of  arbitration.  There  were  other  and 
earlier  issues,  however,  in  this  period,  at  least  one  of 
which  is  worthy  of  notice. 

By  the  purchase  of  Alaska  we  had  acquired  the 
chief  breeding  ground  of   the  seals,   the  only  other 
breeding  ground  being  in  Russian  posses-  The  Bering 
sion.     Americans  and  Russians  could  there-   Sea  contro- 
fore  take  the  seals  on  land  and  under  condi-  versy 
tions  which  permitted  of  regulation  and  protection  to 
the  herds.     But  the  Canadians,  who  had  always  been 
enterprising  sealers,  could  take  the  seals  only  on  the 
high  seas,  a  method  which  threatened  the  existence  of 

39 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


the  herds.  America  and  Russia  were  therefore  in 
terested  in  protecting  the  seals,  but  Britain,  acting  in 
these  outside  matters  for  Canada,  was  interested  in 
maintaining  this  destructive  freedom  of  the  sealer. 
In  this  Britain  and  Canada  were  certainly  on  unen 
viable  ground,  sacrificing  a  valuable  human  interest 
to  the  interests  of  a  local  industry.  But  men  whose 
all  was  invested  in  the  sealing  industry  could  not  be 
expected  to  sacrifice  it  willingly.  And  whatever 
Britain  herself  might  have  thought  of  the  issue,  it 
was  contrary  to  the  principles  of  colonial  liberty  for 
which  we  had  fought  for  her  to  coerce  Canada.  And 
though  America  and  Russia  protested  against  the 
destructive  selfishness  of  taking  the  seals  at  sea,  they 
did  not  seem  inclined  to  share  with  the  Canadians 
the  privilege  of  taking  seals  on  land,  a  privilege  of 
which  they  enjoyed  a  monopoly. 

Having  failed  to  secure  the  necessary  international 
agreement,  our  government  resorted  to  the  extraor- 
We  seize  dinary  measure  of  assuming  jurisdiction 
Canadian  over  Bering  Sea,  and  seized,  condemned,  and 
vessels  so^  cerj-ajn  Canadian  sealing  vessels  sixty 
miles  from  land.  It  had  long  been  the  rule  of  all 
civilized  nations  that  nations  exercised  jurisdiction 
over  the  sea  adjoining  their  coasts  for  a  distance  of 
three  miles  from  the  shore.  The  high  seas  beyond 
this  limit  are  no-man's  land  or  every  man's  land,  and 
all  are  united  to  prevent  their  appropriation.  Britain 
was  therefore  instant  and  sharp  in  her  protest.  She 
had  quite  as  much  warrant  for  war  as  we  had  in  1812 

40 


THE   CRISIS   OF  ARBITRATION 

if  she  had  been  inclined  to  use  it.     She  chose  instead 
to  negotiate  and  finally  to  arbitrate. 

In  the  negotiations  which  followed  and  in  the  later 
arbitration,  we  advanced  the  most  novel  and  extraor 
dinary  claims,  —  first  that  Bering  Sea  was  a  Mare 
Clausum  or  closed  sea,  and  therefore  subject  to  national 
control.  This  claim,  however,  was  soon  dropped  as 
being  obviously  indefensible.  Other  claims  were  ad 
vanced  looking  to  the  same  end.  It  was  even  urged 
that  the  seals  were  semi-domestic  animals  and  that 
we  might  therefore  claim  a  sort  of  ownership  of  them, 
no  matter  where  they  might  stray.  These  and  other 
arguments  were  solemnly  urged  before  the  arbitration 
commission,  but  all  were  decided  against  us,  and  we 
were  compelled  to  pay  damages  for  the  vessels  we  had 
seized.  The  controversy  was  aggravated,  perhaps,  by 
the  reputed  anti-British  sentiment  of  Mr.  Blaine,  our 
Secretary  of  State. 

From  a  diplomatic  standpoint  Britain  appears  in 
this  transaction  to  great  advantage.     She  was  cool, 
firm,   and   eminently  correct,   maintaining  The  right 
her  clear  right  as  defined  by  long-standing  and  wrong 
usage.     In  contrast,  the  American  proce-   of  the  case 
dure  was  precipitate,  hazardous,  and  innovating.     Yet 
it  is  not  to  be  forgotten  that  the  net  result  of  it  all 
was  the  destruction  of  the  seals  and  the  sacrifice  of 
human  interests.     It  was  a  case  where  law  and  prece 
dent  were    clearly  inadequate   for   their   purpose   in 
this  vague  and  remote  part  of  the  world.     Britain, 
respecting  Canadian  liberty  even  in  its  narrow  and 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


shortsighted  exercise,  stood  by  law  and  precedent. 
We  attempted,  from  mixed  motives  and  by  ill-con 
sidered  methods,  to  defend  real  interests.  But  what 
ever  the  merits  of  the  case,  it  was  peaceably  settled 
despite  its  incidents  of  asperity  and  needless  prov 
ocation. 

There  soon  followed  a  controversy  over  the  Vene 
zuelan  boundary,  which  assumed  a  much  more  serious 
Venezuela  character.  Venezuela  adjoins  on  the  east 
boundary  the  British  colony  of  Guiana,  and  a  dispute 
dispute  as  to  fae  boundary  between  them  had  long 
existed.  Finally  Venezuela  arrested  two  British  officers 
on  the  disputed  territory  and  then  appealed  to  the 
United  States  for  protection  against  the  inevitable 
British  claim  for  reparation.  This  aid  was  finally 
granted.  President  Cleveland,  taking  his  stand  upon 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  virtually  threatened  war  against 
Britain  unless  she  consented  to  submit  the  matter  in 
dispute  to  arbitration. 

It  is  difficult  for  an  American  to  understand  how 

this  demand  impressed  the  British  public.     To  begin 

with,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  little  known 

Britain  re-  7 

sents  our  outside  our  own  country,  and  its  validity 
demands  had  never  been  ac}mitted  by  any  other  na 
tion.  Great  Britain  had  challenged  it  almost  at  the 
moment  of  its  announcement.  Bismarck  had  called 
it  a  piece  of  international  impertinence.  It  had  no 
precedent  and  rested  solely  upon  our  own  fiat.  This 
is  quite  enough  for  us,  but  it  is  hardly  satisfactory  to 
others. 

42 


THE   CRISIS  OF  ARBITRATION 


But  even  conceding  the  validity  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  this  seemed  a  most  preposterous  applica 
tion  of  it.  That  doctrine  was  originally  a  warning  to 
certain  European  powers  engaged  in  a  reactionary 
effort  to  restore  the  authority  of  antiquated  govern 
mental  systems  at  home,  —  and  incidentally,  to  re 
store  the  authority  of  Spain  over  her  revolted  colo 
nies,  —  against  extending  their  "  system  "  to  the  Western 
Hemisphere.  England  was  not  one  of  these  countries, 
and  indeed  it  was  at  her  suggestion  that  the  step  was 
taken.  Gradually,  however,  the  doctrine  was  broad 
ened  into  the  popular  slogan,  "America  for  the  Amer 
icans,"  and  it  became  a  general  warning  to  European 
powers  not  to  seek  territorial  acquisitions  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere.  Existing  territorial  posses 
sions  it  did  not  undertake  to  disturb.  Thus  far  it 
was  intelligible  and  fairly  justifiable  as  an  assertion 
of  national  self-interest.  Englishmen  could  under 
stand  why  we  did  not  wish  such  a  power  as  Germany 
to  get  a  foothold  on  our  side.  They  could  understand 
why  we  did  not  wish  France  to  occupy  Mexico  as  she 
tried  to  do  during  our  Civil  War,  even  though  she 
already  occupied  islands  in  the  Caribbean  and  her 
colony  of  Guiana.  Her  position  in  Mexico  was  much 
nearer  and  more  dangerous  to  us. 

But  why  England,  whose  possessions  bordered  ours 
for  three  thousand  miles,  should  be  restrained  from 
punishing  a  border  outrage  on  a  disputed  boundary 
with  a  semibarbarous  nation  thousands  of  miles 
away,  was  not  clear.  If  the  theory  of  the  Monroe 

43 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


Doctrine  covered  the  case,  its  spirit  did  not,  or  if  it 
did,  then  that  spirit  was  one  of  meddlesomeness  rather 
than  of  reasonable  self-interest.  So  the  Englishman 
reasoned. 

To  all  this  was  added  the  immense  disparity  between 
the  two  civilizations.  Britain  incontestably  stood  in 
The  inter  ^e  ^ron^  rank  of  civilized  powers.  Her  ad- 
ests  of  civ-  ministration  of  backward  colonies  was  the 
best  the  world  had  known,  incomparably 
better  than  any  such  people  itself  could  supply.  Vene 
zuela  was  the  veriest  caricature  of  civilization  and 
free  government  as  we,  above  all  nations,  should  know. 
If  any  stretching  was  to  be  done,  the  interests  of  civili 
zation  required  that  the  British  authority  rather  than 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  should  be  stretched. 

Finally,  it  did  not  help  matters  to  the  English 
mind  that  this  seemingly  unreasonable  demand  should 
have  been  made  so  peremptorily  and  under  threat  of 
war.  It  will  be  clear  that  President  Cleveland's 
procedure  subjected  the  friendliness  of  the  British 
people  to  a  pretty  severe  test. 

On  the  American  side  two  facts  were  discernible, 
though  inextricably  intermingled.  The  first  was  lin- 
Aftermath  SermS  resentment  toward  Great  Britain, 
of  the  Civil  whom  we  unjustly  held  responsible  as  a 
nation  for  the  Alabama  injuries  and  the 
effort  to  break  our  blockade.  The  opinion  was  preva 
lent  that  Great  Britain,  or  at  least  her  governing 
classes,  hated  our  democracy,  feared  our  expansion, 
and  desired  the  disruption  of  the  Union.  The  nu- 

44 


THE   CRISIS   OF  ARBITRATION 

merous  occasions  in  which  the  British  people  had 
saved  us  from  disaster,  favored  our  independence, 
and  encouraged  our  expansion,  had  all  been  of  the 
inconspicuous  and  undramatic  sort  which  appeal 
little  to  popular  imagination.  Not  until  the  next 
crisis  in  our  history  was  Britain's  attitude  toward 
us  to  become  really  apparent.  This  prevalent  sus 
picion  and  dislike  of  Britain  our  President  at  that 
time  is  said  to  have  shared. 

But  another  and  far  worthier  motive  was  present 
in  the  mind  both  of  the  President  and  of  the  people. 
It  was  the  conviction  that  the  relations  American 
between  all  nations  should  be  regulated  idealism 
by  reason  rather  than  by  force.  It  mattered  not 
that  England  was  a  worthy  nation  and  Venezuela 
an  unworthy  one.  If  England  had  a  just  case  against 
her  adversary  as  she  claimed,  a  fair  tribunal  would 
establish  her  claim.  This  broad  generalization  is  a 
typical  example  of  sincere  American  idealism  which 
is  often  heard  among  us  to-day. 

It  is  undeniable  that  Britain  was  less  disposed  to 
recognize  such  ideal  methods  than  we  believed  our 
selves  to  be.  Perhaps  it  may  be  said  that  English 
experience  with  backward  peoples,  —  and  practicability 
even  with  developed  peoples,  —  had  made  her  skep 
tical  as  to  the  practicability  of  such  methods.  Ex 
perience  generally  has  a  tendency  to  qualify  our 
faith  in  the  practicability  of  ideals.  Lord  Salisbury 
at  the  time  expressed  the  feeling  of  the  British  Gov 
ernment  and  of  the  British  people  that  reasonable 

45 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


as  the  principle  of  arbitration  might  seem,  much  ex 
perience  would  be  required  before  it  could  become  a 
practical  and  just  procedure.  For  instance,  in  the 
present  case,  if  arbitration  were  agreed  upon,  what 
kind  of  evidence  would  such  a  tribunal  consider? 
Ancient  treaties  and  agreements  would  of  course  be 
studied,  but  suppose  these  proved  hopelessly  am 
biguous,  as  has  so  often  happened!  On  what  would 
they  then  base  their  decision?  On  governmental 
efficiency?  On  developed  commercial  or  industrial 
interests?  Would  Venezuela  agree  to  admit  such 
considerations?  Would  Britain  consent,  —  should 
Britain  consent,  —  to  have  them  altogether  excluded  ? 
And  considering  the  case  more  broadly,  could  any 
tribunal  of  arbitration  venture  to  assess  the  merits  of 
competing  civilizations?  Would  not  prejudice  run 
riot  in  such  a  case?  Would  any  people  accept  a  ver 
dict  which  seemed  to  brand  them  as  inferiors?  And 
yet  have  the  merits  of  competing  civilizations  no  right 
to  be  heard  in  such  a  case  ?  Do  we  realize  that  if  our 
quarrel  with  Spain  had  been  submitted  to  arbitration, 
any  tribunal  that  could  have  been  formed  would  have 
left  Cuba  in  the  control  of  Spain,  that  arbitration 
would  call  a  halt  to  all  of  that  forcible  revision  of  human 
affairs  to  which  so  much  of  our  progress  has  been  due  ? 
Such  considerations  as  these,  —  very  real  to  the 
minds  of  those  widely  experienced  in  dealing  with  all 
kinds  of  peoples,  —  were  far  more  present  to  the 
British  mind  than  to  our  own.  They  saw  in  Presi 
dent  Cleveland's  ultimatum,  therefore,  not  only 

46 


THE   CRISIS   OF   ARBITRATION 


meddlesomeness,  —  for  by  universal  agreement  the 
matter  did  not  in  the  least  menace  our  interests,  — 
but  an  offensive  peremptoriness,  and  finally  a  doc 
trinaire  idealism  which  might  easily  result  in  a  mis 
carriage  of  justice.  The  situation  was  a  serious  one. 

None  the  less  the  British  government  acquiesced  in 
our  demand.  This  was  not  done  at  once,  for  feeling 
ran  high  in  England  against  a  demand  Britain 
which  seemed  both  arrogant  and  un-  yields  to 
reasonable.  Moreover  much  work  re-  demands 
mained  to  be  done  in  the  arrangement  of  preliminaries 
before  there  could  be  any  hope  of  a  satisfactory  de 
cision.  Several  years  passed  in  this  patient  work  of 
preliminaries  and  in  the  even  more  important  work 
of  influencing  the  feeling  of  the  two  peoples.  The 
work  was  at  last  finished,  and  at  about  the  moment 
when  we  peremptorily  refused  to  arbitrate  our  quarrel 
with  Spain,  the  Venezuelan  boundary  dispute  was 
settled  by  arbitration.  It  must  not  be  forgotten, 
however,  that  opinion  in  Britain  has  never  wavered 
that  our  action  in  the  matter  was  one  of  high-handed 
injustice.  It  was  therefore  with  mutual  heart  burn 
ings  that  we  drew  near  the  great  crisis  which  at  the 
end  of  the  century  was  to  modify  profoundly  both  our 
national  destiny  and  the  relations  of  the  two  peoples. 


47 


VIII 
THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS   BEGINS,    1897-1898 

THE  Spanish-American  War  marks  an  epoch  in  the 
relation  of  the  two  countries.  Not  that  it  called  for 
definite  cooperation  or  involved  any  nominal  change, 
but  it  afforded  abundant  occasion  for  the  display  of 
national  feeling.  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the 
attitude  of  Britain  at  this  time  was  a  revelation  to 
the  American  people.  Entering  the  war  with  a  vague 
consciousness  of  grievances  dating  from  Civil  War 
days,  and  with  the  memory  of  recent  clashes  and 
partial  diplomatic  defeats,  our  general  attitude  toward 
Britain  was  one  of  suspicion.  We  spoke  of  her  as 
our  traditional  enemy  and  fancied  that  she  was  jealous 
of  our  prosperity  and  that  she  feared  the  reaction  of 
our  democracy  upon  her  effete  monarchical  institu 
tions.  Prudence  might  restrain  her  from  attacking 
us,  but  she  was  secretly  hostile  to  our  expansion  and 
to  the  growth  of  our  institutions.  It  had  been  for 
years  the  standing  resource  of  our  politicians  to  "  twist 
the  lion's  tail,"  as  this  appeal  to  anti-British  sentiment 
was  called. 

This  anticipated  attitude  on  the  part  of  England 

Unexpected  was  not  rean'zed>  but  it  found  its  counter- 
hostility  of  part  in  the  hostility  of  other  nations  whom 
we  had  not  thought  of  as  unfriendly. 
Popular  sentiment  in  Germany,  Austria,  and  espe 
cially  in  France,  was  astonishingly  bitter.  Americans 

48 


THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS   BEGINS 

living  in  Germany  were  treated  with  a  discourtesy 
which  prepared  them  not  a  little  to  understand  the 
German  attitude  during  the  present  war.  In  Paris, 
feeling  ran  so  high  that  it  provoked  a  temporary 
American  boycott  of  French  millinery  and  dress 
making,  which  caused  the  utmost  alarm  in  the  trade. 
Austria,  more  remote,  manifested  her  religious  and 
dynastic  sympathies  for  Spain  in  a  not  unnatural 
manner.  The  explanation  of  all  this  was  precisely 
that  which  popular  opinion  had  attributed  to  Great 
Britain,  a  jealousy  of  the  great  power  whose  growth 
had  at  last  brought  it  into  conflict  with  Europe  with 
certain  menace  to  the  less  vigorous  life  of  the  latter. 

The  surprise  evoked  by  this  unanticipated  hostility 
emphasized  by  contrast  the  unexpected  friendliness  of 
Britain.  Sympathy  for  our  cause  was  in-  unexpected 
stant  and  general.  It  was  manifested  by  friendship 
every  organ  of  popular  expression,  popular  c 
demonstrations,  the  press,  and  private  utterances  of 
every  sort.  The  attitude  was  best  expressed  by  the 
blunt  statement  of  the  London  Spectator,  "We  are  not, 
and  we  do  not  pretend  to  be,  an  agreeable  people,  but 
when  there  is  trouble  in  the  family,  we  know  where 
our  hearts  are." 

The  surprise  of  it  all  was  not  lessened  by  any  ap 
parent  motive  of  self-interest  on  Britain's  part.  Spain 
was  not  an  enemy  that  she  dreaded,  as  was  Russia 
when  attacked  by  Japan.  We  were  not  in  any  way 
pulling  her  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire.  Neither  directly 
nor  indirectly  could  she  hope  to  profit  by  the  humilia- 
*  *  49 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


tion  and  despoiling  of  Spain.  It  was  purely  a  family 
sentiment.  We  had  not  felt  it,  had  not  known  that 
she  felt  it.  Perhaps  she  did  not  know  that  we  did 
not  feel  it  though  our  attitude  during  the  Boer  War 
and  in  the  Venezuela  controversy  must  have  been 
rather  a  chilling  revelation  of  American  sentiment. 
Nor  was  this  British  sentiment  studied.  It  is  simply 
impossible  to  work  up  a  general  and  popular  demonstra 
tion  of  sympathy  on  short  notice,  especially  in  a  coun 
try  where  the  press  is  really  free.  If  we  were  in  any 
doubt  as  to  the  sincerity  and  spontaneity  of  this  sym 
pathy,  Spain,  at  least,  was  not.  No,  nor  France  nor 
Germany.  The  latter  in  particular  saw  in  it  an 
ominous  hint  of  an  Anglo-Saxon  solidarity  which 
she  strove  thenceforth  to  prevent  by  every  means  in 
her  power. 

But  there  was  more  than  popular  sympathy.  The 
Favor  of  British  government  rendered  us  the  most 
British  signal  services  and  in  more  than  one 

emergency  saved  us  from  disaster. 

Lord  Cromer,  at  that  time  British  administrator  in 
Egypt,  has  recently  recounted  his  own  part  in  one  of 
these  transactions.  The  American  fleet  had  been  sent 
to  destroy  the  Spanish  warships  in  Manila.  An 
ticipating  this,  the  more  powerful  Spanish  fleet,  which 
later  sailed  to  Santiago,  was  dispatched  from  Spain 
to  Manila  via  Suez  to  reenforce  the  Spanish  fleet 
there.  They  could  reach  their  destination  only  by 
coaling  en  route,  and  this  was  begun  at  the  great 
British  coaling  station  of  Port  Said,  When  Lord 

5° 


THE  EUROPEAN  CRISIS  BEGINS 

Cromer  heard  of  it,  he  peremptorily  stopped  the  pro 
ceeding,  even  compelling  them  to  take  out  part  of  the 
coal  already  shipped.  International  law  on  this  point, 
as  on  most  points,  is  rather  vague.  It  is  understood 
that  a  belligerent  vessel  may  legitimately  take  enough 
coal  in  a  neutral  port  to  take  it  to  the  nearest  home 
port.  But  the  practice  is  such,  as  Lord  Cromer  says, 
that  he  could  easily  have  "stretched"  the  principle 
sufficiently  to  allow  them  coal  enough  to  reach  Manila, 
the  nearest  home  port  in  the  direction  of  their  voyage. 
He  chose  to  stretch  it  in  our  favor,  allowing  them  only 
enough  to  take  them  to  Barcelona.  As  a  result  the 
Spanish  fleet  in  Manila  was  not  reenforced  and  our 
fleet  won  the  victory.  Suppose  our  fleet  had  been 
destroyed  and  the  combined  Spanish  fleets  had  then 
sailed  for  America !  Suppose  a  German  administrator 
had  been  in  control  of  Egypt !  What  would  have  been 
the  result  to  America? 

But  a  far  greater  danger  confronted  us  at  that  time 
than  the  combined  Spanish  fleets.     It  will  be  remem 
bered  that  our  destruction  of  the  Spanish  Dan  er   , 
fleet    at    Manila    had    unexpected    conse-   clash  with 
quences.     When  Dewey  started,  there  was  Gennany 
no  thought  of  occupying  the  Philippines,  either  perma 
nently  or  temporarily.     But  when  the  Spanish  fleet 
had  been  destroyed,  we  found  ourselves  confronted  by 
an  unexpected  situation.    The  Filipinos  were  in  revolt 
against  the  Spanish  government.    That  government 
depended  upon  the  fleet  for  support,  and  the  destruc 
tion  of  the  fleet  left  it  helpless.    There  was  the  gravest 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


danger  that  the  Spanish  population  would  be  massacred. 
It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  occupy  the  Islands 
in  the  interest  of  the  Spaniards  themselves,  and  Dewey 
stayed,  at  first  on  his  own  authority,  and  later  with 
sanction  and  military  reinforcements.  This  temporary 
occupation  developed,  quite  unexpectedly,  into  annexa 
tion. 

The  American  people  had  not  the  slightest  anticipa 
tion  of  this  development,  but  other  nations  were  more 

thoughtful.        Germany,      in      particular, 
Germany  .  . 

anticipates  though  not  anticipating  our  annexation 
Spain's  of  the  Islands,  quite  foresaw  that  our 
victory  would  leave  them  helpless  and 
result  in  their  loss  to  Spain.  It  was  at  the  moment 
of  her  fullest  enthusiasm  for  colonies.  If  Spain  lost 
the  Philippines  and  we  did  not  take  them,  here  was 
her  chance. 

Hence  a  German  squadron  more  powerful  than  that 
of  Admiral  Dewey  was  dispatched  to  the  Philippines 
to  be  prepared  for  whatever  might  happen.  It  arrived 
after  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  fleet  and  found 
Manila  Bay  in  occupation  of  the  Americans,  who  had 
taken  over  the  necessary  task  of  policing  the  harbor, 
assigning  anchorages  to  arriving  ships,  forbidding 
movement  after  dark  lest  there  be  collisions,  etc. 
What  happened  is  variously  told,  doubtless  with 
much  picturesque  modification  of  detail,  but  with 
agreement  as  to  essentials.  Perhaps  the  brief  account 
current  in  Manila  will  serve  our  purpose  as  well  as 
any.  It  condenses  into  one  brief  incident  what  was 

52 


THE   EUROPEAN   CRISIS  BEGINS 

in  reality  a  prolonged  and  harassing  negotiation,  but 
it  faithfully  portrays  the  true  relation  involved. 

According  to  this  account,  the  Germans  on  arrival 
were  assigned  an  anchorage  as  usual.     The  German 
Admiral  replied  with  much  hauteur:    "I  Dewey.s 
am  here  by  the  order  of  his  majesty  the  clash  with 
German  Emperor,"  and  he  proceeded  to   Germans 
anchor  elsewhere  than  in  the  place  indicated.     The 
meaning  of  this  was  that  he  did  not  recognize  the 
right  of   the  Americans  to  exercise  authority  there, 
this  doubtless  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  for 
even  the  briefest  and  most  tacit  recognition  of  that 
authority  might  have  had  grave  consequences  in  later 
diplomatic  negotiations.     Care  must  therefore  be  taken 
from  the  outset  to  acknowledge  no  other  authority 
than  that  of  the  Kaiser. 

This  and  other  deliberate  repudiations  of  American 
authority  at  last  raised  a  definite  issue.  Admiral 
Dewey  finally  sent  a  peremptory  note  to  the  German 
Admiral,  demanding  that  he  keep  the  anchorage  as 
signed  and  adding,  —  so  the  popular  version  goes,  — 
that  "if  he  wanted  fight  he  could  have  it  at  the  drop 
of  the  hat."  The  German  Admiral  now  called  on  the 
commander  of  a  British  cruiser  lying  in  Manila  and 
asked  him  this  question:  "What  would  you  do  in 
the  event  of  trouble  between  Admiral  Dewey  and 
myself?"  To  which  the  latter  is  said  to  have  re 
plied  :  "What  I  would  do  in  that  event  is  known  only 
to  Admiral  Dewey  and  myself."  The  German  Admiral 
returned  to  his  flagship  and  made  no  further  trouble. 

53 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


The  next  morning  the  British  cruiser  was  found  an 
chored  between  the  flagship  of  Admiral  Dewey  and 
that  of  the  German  Admiral.  Shortly  after,  the 
German  squadron  weighed  anchor  and  sailed  away. 

Whatever  the  details  regarding  this  much  disputed 
incident,  the  main  facts  are  perfectly  clear.  The 
German  squadron  was  there  to  take  possession  of  the 
Philippines  if  possible,  and  with  distinct  instructions 
not  to  recognize  American  authority  there.  Nor  can 
it  be  doubted  that  these  instructions  were  further  to 
the  effect  that  while  American  opposition  was  to  be 
ignored,  even  resisted  if  necessary,  a  clash  with  Britain 
was  to  be  avoided.  The  reported  answer  and  action  of 
the  British  commander,  —  both  undoubtedly  in  accord 
with  the  instructions  of  his  government,  —  was  sig 
nificant  of  the  relation  which  that  government  main 
tained  toward  us  in  that  momentous  crisis.  "What  I 
would  do  is  known  only  to  Admiral  Dewey  and  my 
self."  That  is,  "  there  is  an  understanding  between 
the  two  peoples  and  they  may  be  expected  to  act  in 
concert  in  any  serious  emergency."  And  the  position 
of  that  cruiser  between  the  two  flagships,  insignificant 
though  it  might  be  in  itself,  was  a  symbol  of  the  posi 
tion  which  the  mighty  power  of  the  British  navy  has 
steadfastly  maintained,  between  ourselves  and  those 
that  would  do  us  harm.  Once  more  let  us  imagine  the 
case  as  it  might  have  been.  Without  the  certain 
intervention  of  Britain  the  least  that  could  have  hap 
pened  would  have  been  ignominious  surrender  to 
German  demands,  —  the  most,  a  conflict  which  would 

54 


THE   EUROPEAN   CRISIS   BEGINS 

have  brought  us  crushing  defeat  with  consequences 
which  it  must  make  us  shudder  to  contemplate.  We 
have  been  accustomed  to  think  lightly  of  our  war 
with  Spain  as  one  that  at  no  time  involved  serious 
danger  to  ourselves.  It  was  in  fact  a  period  of  extreme 
crisis,  in  which  destruction  yawned  before  us,  a  destruc 
tion  from  which  we  were  saved  by  the  friendship  of 
Britain.  If  we  are  inclined  to  discount  this  friendship, 
it  is  well  to  remember  that  Germany  at  least  took  it 
seriously,  the  action  of  the  British  commander  having 
been  made  the  subject  of  serious  diplomatic  protest 
on  the  part  of  the  German  government. 

Again  we  need  not  assume  that  Britain's  friendship 
was  wholly  disinterested.  Such  friendships  are  rare 
in  the  world,  even  between  individuals,  and  between 
nations  are  hardly  to  be  expected.  No  doubt  British 
statesmen  have  been  conscious  for  some  time  that 
with  the  growing  tendency  of  her  rivals  to  unite  for 
purposes  hostile  to  her  interests,  it  was  becoming  in 
creasingly  difficult  for  her  to  protect  those  interests 
alone  and  the  need  of  cooperation  was  becoming 
ever  more  urgent.  What  more  natural  than  that 
she  should  look  to  her  nearest  kin  for  cooperation  in 
defense  of  interests  that  were  at  once  hers  and  theirs. 
But  if  statesmen  reasoned  thus,  the  people  did  not. 
They  have  been  far  from  appreciating  the  dangers 
ahead  of  them  and  have  been  almost  as  unconscious 
as  we  have  been  of  the  designs  of  their  enemies.  Yet 
it  was  the  British  people  even  more  than  the  British 
statesmen  who  gave  us  their  sympathy  at  that  time. 

55 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


If  they  had  been  jealous  and  unfriendly,  they  would 
have  shown  it.  There  is  no  country  in  the  world 
where  people  express  their  feelings  more  freely.  They 
were  not  jealous  but  friendly,  the  only  people  in  the 
world  who  were  friendly  to  us  at  that  time. 

In  estimating  this  attitude  of  the  British  people  it  is 
well  to  remember  that  this  war  marked  an  epoch  in  our 
Our  new  national  policy.  Up  to  this  time  we  had 
colonial  been  a  continental  nation  and  had  sought 
policy  no  colonies.  When  the  war  broke  out,  we 

did  not  possess  a  single  square  mile  of  territory  outside 
of  the  American  continent.  When  it  ended,  we  pos 
sessed  Hawaii  (which  otherwise  would  have  become 
an  important  British  station),  Puerto  Rico,  Samoa, 
Guam,  and  the  Philippines,  while  we  had  acquired 
naval  stations  in  Cuba  and  rights  of  control  that 
amounted  to  partial  possession.  In  all  of  these  we 
encroached  upon  areas  where  Britain  was  our  nat 
ural  rival.  Had  we  not  occupied  Hawaii,  Britain 
would  have  acquired  it  by  the  will  of  its  people.  We 
had  long  been  rivals  of  Britain  in  Samoa.  The  Philip 
pines  are  near  Hong  Kong,  the  headquarters  of  British 
power  in  the  Far  East,  and  are  in  that  great  island 
area  which  is  unquestionably  dominated  by  Britain. 
The  Caribbean  Sea  is  the  gateway  to  Panama  and  was 
controlled  by  Jamaica  and  other  British  possessions 
there,  while  Britain  held  the  right  by  treaty  to  share 
with  us  in  the  building  and  control  of  the  Canal. 
Nations  are  generally  very  jealous  of  a  power  that 
thus  pushes  into  their  "sphere  of  influence,"  appropri- 

56 


THE  EUROPEAN  CRISIS  BEGINS 

ating  desirable  territories,  bidding  for  coveted  trade, 
and  establishing  uncomfortable  neighbor  relations.  We 
can  imagine  what  Germany  would  have  felt  if  we  had 
pushed  into  regions  where  her  influence  was  paramount. 
We  know  what  Britain  feels  when  Germany  tries  to 
establish  herself  in  Morocco  over  against  Gibraltar  or 
elsewhere  in  proximity  to  her  interests.  Britain  has 
striven  for  years  to  avoid  this  unwelcome  proximity, 
for  the  two  peoples  are  not  friendly  and  do  not  trust 
each  other. 

But  from  the  first  Britain  has  welcomed  the  Amer 
ican  advance.  She  did  not  try  to  get  the  Philippines, 
but  assisted  us  to  get  them.  She  withdrew  from 
Samoa,  leaving  us  thus  a  freer  hand.  She  allowed  us 
to  take  Hawaii,  though  her  possession  would  have 
been  the  alternative  soon  or  late.  She  encouraged  our 
expulsion  of  Spain  from  the  West  Indies  and  has  since 
favored  every  extension  of  our  influence  there,  though 
both  Germany  and  France  have  opposed  it.  Above  all 
she  voluntarily  surrendered  her  rights  in  the  Panama 
Canal  without  compensation  on  the  sole  condition  that 
we  should  permit  its  use  by  all  nations  on  equal  terms. 

Perhaps  nothing  is  more  significant  of  the  relation 
of  Britain  to  America  than  her  attitude  toward  Ger 
many  in  the  period  immediately  preceding  Relations 
the    World    War.     We  have  only    slowly  preceding 
come    to    realize    how    far-reaching    were  WorldWar 
Germany's    designs.     Not    even    yet    do    we    realize 
how  far  they  concerned  America.     We  have  heard, 
rather  incredulously  perhaps,  of  Germany's  designs  on 

57 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


South  America,  and  have  realized,  although  very 
feebly,  that  these  designs  might  concern  us.  But 
Germany  had  plans  for  regions  much  nearer  to  us 
than  South  America  and  was  much  nearer  than  we 
realize  to  carrying  them  out. 

•  It  must  be  remembered  that  in  her  plans  of  expansion, 
which  embraced  the  entire  world,  Germany  figured 
largely  on  enlisting  the  cooperation  of  other  nations 
until  such  time  as  she  could  do  without  them.  In 
particular  she  counted  on  the  aid  of  Britain,  as  her 
imperialist  writers  in  recent  years  have  plainly  in 
dicated.  For  this  cooperation  Britain  was  to  receive 
very  large  rewards,  though  it  is  an  open  secret  that 
Germany  expected  the  British  Empire  soon  to  collapse, 
with  the  result  that  Germany  would  become  virtually 
supreme.  The  concessions  made  to  these  temporary 
allies  were  therefore  not  to  be  permanent. 

In  San  Domingo  the  United  States  had  established 
an  unofficial  receivership  for  the  payment  of  the  bank 
rupt  nation's  debts.     This  worked  well  until 
The  San  ...     . 

Domingo        a  revolution  broke  out  which  interrupted 

receiver-  fts  operation  and  endangered  the  lives  and 
property  of  foreigners.  The  United  States, 
mindful  of  the  sensibilities  of  Latin  America,  was  re 
luctant  to  intervene  by  force  and  did  so  only  when  a 
German  cruiser  approached,  when  order  was  restored 
and  the  interests  of  foreigners  again  protected. 

Similar  conditions  existed  in  Hayti,  and  it  was  ap 
parent  that  there  too  intervention  would  be  necessary. 
When  this  became  apparent  early  in  1914,  a  joint  note 

58 


THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS  BEGINS 

was  received  by  our  government  from  France  and 
Germany  to  the  effect  that  in  the  event  that  in 
tervention  should  become  necessary  in  the  The  Ha 
affairs  of  Hayti,  the  intervention  of  a  single  tian  prob- 
power  would  not  be  satisfactory  to  them.  lem 
This  meant,  of  course,  that  they  demanded  the  right 
to  intervene,  either  with  or  without  our  cooperation. 
This  was  precisely  the  thing  that  we  wished  to  avoid, 
for  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  a  thoroughly  de 
moralized  people  may  easily  become  permanent  oc 
cupation,  as  the  history  of  Egypt  has  shown.  Above 
all  things,  we  did  not  wish  Germany  in  Hayti,  for  we 
knew  she  wished  a  foothold  in  the  West  Indies  with  a 
view  to  extending  her  power  in  our  part  of  the  world, 
and  that  she  would  be  disposed  to  take  advantage  of 
any  pretext  to  remain.  It  is  difficult  to  say  what 
the  outcome  of  this  challenge  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
might  have  been  if  the  Great  War  had  not  followed 
almost  immediately  afterward,  giving  us  a  chance  to 
bring  Hayti  under  our  protection  and  restore  order  to 
her  distracted  state. 

But  the  important  thing  to  note  is  this  cooperation 
between  Germany  and  France.     There  can  be  little 
doubt  that  it  was  Germany  that  made  the   German 
proposal.     She  felt  that  we  would  be  less  and  France 
jealous  of  two  powers  than  of  one,  for  it   co°Perate 
would  look  less  like  annexation.     Moreover,  the  par 
ticipation   of   France   was   plausible,    for   Hayti   was 
once  a  French  possession  and  it  is  the  only  Latin- 
American  republic  whose  people  speak  French.    Now 

59 


AMERICA   AND   BRITAIN 


that  we  have  learned  that  Germany  was  even  then 
contemplating  the  seizure  of  the  French  colonies,  we 
can  of  course  understand  that  she  looked  upon  this 
arrangement  with  France  merely  as  a  temporary  ex 
pedient.  But  the  point  for  us  to  note  is  that  even  so 
friendly  a  country  as  France  was  induced  to  cooperate 
in  a  plan  which  she  knew  would  be  bitterly  resented 
by  our  country.  She  was  not  particularly  hostile  to 
us,  —  though  as  we  have  seen  she  had  been  unsympa 
thetic  toward  us  during  our  war  with  Spain,  —  but 
she  was  willing  to  seek  even  a  very  slight  and  un 
certain  advantage  at  our  expense. 

German  schemes  for  cooperation  with  Britain  were 
much  more  extensive  and  involved  much  greater  and 
Germany  more  permanent  advantages  to  the  latter, 
approaches  A  book  published  in  1911  in  Germany  by  a 
recognized  German  authority  elaborated 
a  plan  for  the  virtual  division  of  the  whole  world  be 
tween  these  two  powers,  giving  maps  to  show  the 
spheres  of  each.  Thus  the  map  of  South  America 
gave  the  southern  portion,  —  Chili,  Argentina,  and 
a  part  of  Brazil  to  Germany,  and  the  great  tropical 
portion,  —  Brazil,  Peru,  Ecuador,  etc.,  —  to  Britain. 
Similar  divisions  were  to  be  effected  elsewhere,  all  very 
flattering  to  Britain. 

It  was  in  pursuance  of  this  policy  that  a  German 
of  distinguished  title,  in  the  month  of  June,  1914, 
sought  an  audience  with  the  highest  authority  of  the 
British  government.  He  guided  the  conversation  as 
soon  as  possible  to  the  affairs  of  Mexico,  then  in  a 

60 


THE   EUROPEAN   CRISIS   BEGINS 

most  hopeless  condition,  and  added:  "Do  you  not 
think  it  would  be  a  good  thing  if  your  government 
and  ours  should  jointly  intervene  in  Mexico?  There 
would  be  no  difficulty  in  agreeing  upon  our  different 
spheres  of  influence."  The  proposal  was  peremptorily 
rejected  and  the  distinguished  visitor  virtually  shown 
the  door. 

Let  us  be  careful  to  note  what  this  proposal  meant. 
A  "sphere  of  influence"  is  but  a  euphemism  for  a 
colony  in  the  early  stages  of  occupation  and  consolida 
tion.  Such  a  move  would  therefore  have  given  Ger 
many  a  colony  adjoining  the  United  States,  where  she 
would  have  been  free  to  establish  her  military  power 
and  to  develop  that  much-dreaded  institution,  a  mili 
tary  and  naval  base.  A  base  of  operations  on  our 
frontier  is  the  Greek  horse  inside  our  walls.  So  long 
as  Germany  has  no  possessions  in  the  Western  Hemi 
sphere,  she  is  greatly  handicapped  in  any  aggressive 
policy  which  she  may  be  tempted  to  adopt  there. 
She  would  have  to  begin  by  seizing  some  point  and 
creating  a  base  and  accumulating  supplies,  all  against 
the  opposition  of  an  enemy  whose  own  supplies  were 
near  at  hand.  This  could  be  accomplished  only  by 
an  overwhelming  initial  superiority.  But  with  her 
base  ready  in  advance  and  her  munitions  accumulated 
there,  her  task  would  be  comparatively  easy. 

It  therefore  becomes  the  corner  stone  of  our  policy 
not  to  allow  Germany  or  any  power  that  we  fear  to 
establish  a  base  of  operations  near  us,  either  by  ac 
quiring  a  colony  or  by  "intervening  to  restore  order," 

61 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


or  by  an  alliance  with  some  of  our  lesser  neighbors.  A 
German  base  in  Mexico  would  be  the  worst  possible 
Our  polk  situation  for  us,  because  it  would  not  only 
toward  expose  us  to  attack  by  land,  but  by  furnish- 

Germany       ing   ^   necessary   base  for    the    German 

navy,  it  would  furnish  the  necessary  facilities  for 
attacking  the  Panama  Canal,  our  most  vital  and 
most  vulnerable  possession.  All  this,  of  course,  the 
British  government  perfectly  understood  when  the 
distinguished  visitor  made  his  tempting  proposition. 

But  it  is  to  be  noted  that  Britain  had  no  such  interest 
at  stake  as  we  had.  A  German  base  in  the  Caribbean 
Britain's  would  endanger  Jamaica  and  a  few  other 
lesser  in-  minor  possessions,  but  Britain  realized  per 
fectly  that  if  she  were  ever  at  war  with  Ger 
many,  the  war  would  be  fought  in  Europe.  A  hostile 
base  in  the  West  Indies,  therefore,  while  it  might  be 
fatal  to  us,  could  injure  her  very  little. 

On  the  other  hand,  let  us  note  the  advantage  which 
Britain  would  have  gained  by  such  a  scheme.  First 
German  's  °^  a^'  ^  would  have  given  her  valuable 
bribe  to  territory  in  Mexico.  No  doubt  Britain 
cares  little  for  further  additions  of  terri 
tory  as  such.  Her  hands  are  already  very  full.  But 
Mexico  contains  some  of  the  most  valuable  oil  fields 
in  the  world,  and  their  product,  largely  controlled  by 
British  capital,  is  a  chief  dependence  of  the  British 
navy  which  now  burns  oil  instead  of  coal.  The  Ger 
man  proposal  plainly  indicated  that  this  British  in 
terest  would  be  respected  in  the  division.  Since  the 

62 


THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS  BEGINS 

struggle  in  Mexico  has  largely  turned  on  the  possession 
of  these  oil  fields  and  attempts  have  been  made  re 
peatedly  to  withhold  the  oil  from  Britain,  the  tempta 
tion  to  assure  that  supply  by  occupation  was  a  very 
great  one. 

But  an  infinitely  greater  temptation  was  involved  in 
this  proposal.  Germany,  as  Britain  very  well  knew, 
was  determined  to  expand.  There  were  Germany.s 
various  plans,  any  of  which  would  have  plans  for 
satisfied  her  for  the  time  being  at  least,  exPanslon 
—  through  Belgium  to  the  Channel,  through  the 
Balkans  and  Asia  Minor  to  the  Persian  Gulf,  or  in 
the  Western  Hemisphere.  The  first  two  were  wholly 
inadmissible  from  the  standpoint  of  British  inter 
ests.  The  last  was  infinitely  less  dangerous  to  her 
and  might  easily  have  seemed  advantageous.  If 
Britain  had  consented  to  this  last  scheme,  Germany 
would  have  renounced  the  others.  It  is  stated  on 
credible  authority  that  Germany  has  repeatedly  inti 
mated  to  the  British  government  her  willingness  to 
meet  the  latter's  demands  in  the  Old  World  if  given 
a  free  hand  in  the  New.  Britain  refused  to  give  this, 
and  the  present  war  is  the  price  she  pays  for  her  refusal. 

Again  it  must  not  be  imagined  that  Britain  had  any 
other  motive  in  all  this  than  wise  self-interest.     It  was 
to   protect  herself  that  she  protected  us. 
But  how  is  it  that  it  was  for  her  interest   strength 
to  strengthen  us  and  against  her  interest   Britain's 
to  strengthen   Germany?     In  population, 
in  territory,  in  wealth  we  far  surpass  the  German  Empire. 

63 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


If  she  regarded  us  in  the  same  way,  it  would  seem  to 
be  to  her  interest  to  check  our  growth  by  developing 
a  rival  in  our  vicinity.  Evidently  she  does  not  regard 
us  in  the  same  way.  Concessions  granted  to  Germany 
would  strengthen  her  without  assuring  her  friendship. 
With  America  she  feels  that  that  friendship  is  assured. 
The  English  people  simply  cannot  feel,  —  have  never 
felt,  —  that  we  are  a  separate  people.  We  are  a  sepa 
rate  nation,  no  doubt,  but  so  are  Canada  and  Australia. 
But  the  distinction  is  simply  one  of  geographical  con 
venience.  We  have  the  same  language,  the  same  kind 
of  government,  the  same  notions  of  life  and  all  its 
higher  interests.  We  are  and  have  always  been  to 
England  a  part  of  her  own  people.  There  has  been 
plenty  of  bickering  in  the  family,  as  there  is  in  families 
generally,  but  never  a  serious  risk  that  the  family  could 
be  divided  against  itself  when  threatened  by  a  great 
danger  from  without.  These  bickerings  and  heart 
burnings  have  especially  characterized  periods  of  peace. 
From  the  War  of  1812  to  our  Civil  War  was  such  a 
period  with  the  sense  of  grievance  predominantly  on 
the  side  of  Britain.  From  our  Civil  War  to  the  War 
with  Spain  was  again  a  period  of  relative  coldness  and 
misunderstanding  with  the  sense  of  alienation  rather  on 
our  own  side.  But  no  estrangement  prevented  Britain 
from  supporting  us  against  Germany  in  1898  as  she  had 
done  a  century  earlier  against  France.  And  again  in 
the  present  war,  the  greatest  convulsion  that  the 
world  has  ever  known,  the  struggle  was  precipitated 
by  a  peremptory  refusal  on  Britain's  part  to  sacrifice 

64 


THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS  BEGINS 

our  interests,  even  for  the  greatest  of  advantages,  and 
is  continued  by  the  cooperation  of  our  arms  in  that 
far-away  Europe  that  we  fancied  we  had  left  forever. 

The  history  of  the  two  countries  is  thus  a  history  of 
surface  differences  and  underlying  unity.  When  free 
from  danger,  we  have  differed,  quarreled,  Differences 
even  fought,  but  a  serious  crisis  has  always  conceal 
found  us  united.  On  the  whole,  Britain  real  unity 
has  been  more  conscious  of  the  underlying  unity  than 
we  have  been.  This  is  not  strange.  Britain  is  a  world 
power ;  we  are  an  American  power.  Her  great  family 
of  free  dominions,  Canada,  Australia,  and  the  rest, 
have  familiarized  her  with  the  idea  of  a  scattered  and 
yet  united  people.  She  has  also  had  much  more  to 
do  with  such  powers  as  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia, 
and  knows  how  different  is  the  underlying  feeling  of 
such  alien  peoples.  We,  lacking  these  experiences, 
have  lived  our  lives  much  more  unconsciously,  enjoy 
ing  our  sense  of  security  without  attempting  to  ex 
plain  it. 

Yet  our  very  unconsciousness  is  testimony  to  the 
fact.     Why  have  we  never  worried  about  our  Canadian 
frontier,  never  fortified  or  cared  to  fortify   The  un_ 
it?     There  is  not  another  frontier  in  the   guarded 
world    that   is   left   unguarded   like    that.   frontier 
Why  have  we  never  tried  or  seemingly  cared  to  annex 
Canada?    She  adjoins  our  territory,  shares  our  in 
terests,  and  has  the  only  population  in  the  Western 
Hemisphere  which  could  be  easily  assimilated  to  our 
own.    Britain  has  said  that  she  is  free  to  unite  with 

»  65 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


us  if  she  chooses.  Yet  while  the  project  has  been 
freely  discussed,  even  urged,  and  that  by  Canadians 
themselves,  we  have  never  shown  the  slightest  inclina 
tion  to  unite,  though  we  have  pushed  our  other  frontiers 
out  much  more  hazardously.  The  true  reason  is  that 
we  feel  no  real  sense  of  division  between  us.  The 
arbitrary  boundary  between  us  does  not  separate  us. 

Even  more  significant  is  our  perfect  indifference  to 
the  power  which  the  British  Empire  has  over  us.  We 
have  been  most  careful  that  Germany  should  get  no 
base  in  the  Caribbean,  that  Cuba  and  our  other  Latin- 
American  neighbors  should  enter  into  no  relations  with 
foreign  powers.  We  have  bought  the  Danish  Islands 
and  are  looking  anxiously  at  other  foreign  possessions 
lest  by  sale  or  conquest  they  fall  into  the  possession  of 
some  doubtful  power.  But  it  does  not  worry  us  in 
the  least  that  from  a  score  of  posts  in  the  West  Indies 
Britain  could  strike  our  canal,  that  from  Canada  she 
could  invade  our  states,  that  from  Fiji  she  could  seize 
Samoa,  and  from  Hong  Kong  the  Philippines  are  at 
her  mercy.  In  a  war  with  her  our  navy  would  dis 
appear  from  the  seas  as  promptly  as  did  that  of  Ger 
many,  and  no  Heligoland  prevents  a  descent  on  our 
long  coasts.  But  we  refuse  to  be  worried.  All  such 
considerations  seem  fantastic.  And  they  are  fantastic. 
There  will  be  no  war.  We  know  it.  We  may  think 
about  our  differences,  but  we  build  our  whole  national 
policy  upon  the  unconscious  recognition  of  our  unity. 

When  a  few  years  since  we  were  urged  to  conclude 
treaties  of  arbitration  with  foreign  powers,  an  American 

66 


THE  EUROPEAN   CRISIS  BEGINS 

statesman,  noted  for  his  keen  insight  into  realities, 
expressed  himself  somewhat  as  follows :  "I  am  in  favor 
of  such  a  treaty  with  Great  Britain  be-  possibility 
cause  I  believe  we  would  keep  our  promise,  of  arbitra- 
I  cannot  conceive  of  any  difference  arising  tion 
between  the  two  countries  which  our  people  would 
be  afraid  or  unwilling  to  submit  to  arbitration. 
Such  a  treaty  would  therefore  be  sincere.  But  as 
between  this  country  and  certain  other  countries,  I 
think  that  issues  might  arise  and  probably  will  arise 
which  the  American  people  would  refuse  to  arbitrate. 
If  Germany  were  to  seize  territory  near  our  shores 
on  whatsoever  pretext,  and  should  propose  to  submit 
the  matter  to  arbitration,  we  would  not  arbitrate  but 
would  fight.  We  would  not  take  any  chance  of  having 
such  an  issue  decided  against  us.  It  would  therefore 
be  wrong  and  hypocritical  for  us  to  promise  to  arbi 
trate  such  an  issue  with  such  a  power,  when  we  know 
in  advance  that  we  are  likely  to  refuse  to  do  so  when 
the  time  comes."  This  may  not  have  been  a  con 
clusive  argument  against  arbitration  treaties  with 
such  powers,  but  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  the  dis 
tinction  that  he  draws  between  Britain  and  other 
powers  is  a  correct  one.  We  do  not  fear  serious  trouble 
with  Britain.  We  do  not  feel  the  same  confidence 
as  regards  any  other  great  power. 


IX 
SUPER-EMPIRE 

WHAT  is  the  character  of  this  power  with  which  we 
are  thus  closely  related?  It  is  called  an  empire,  but 
The  Super-  this  is  true  only  in  a  partial  sense.  Empire 
Empire  implies  authority  exercised  by  some  person 
or  people  over  others  who  do  not  share  this  authority 
or  help  to  determine  who  shall  exercise  it.  Rome 
was  an  empire,  even  before  she  called  herself  by  that 
name,  for  the  Roman  people  bore  rule  over  other 
peoples  who  did  not  have  a  voice  in  determining  the 
character  of  that  rule.  Britain  exercises  such  an 
authority  over  Nigeria,  Guiana,  and  other  colonies 
whose  people  seem  unable  either  wisely  to  order  their 
own  affairs  or  intelligently  to  assist  in  doing  so.  In  a 
less  degree  she  exercises  such  an  authority  over  India 
and  Egypt.  In  so  far  Britain  is  an  empire  precisely 
as  we  are  in  so  far  as  we  exercise  authority  over  the 
Philippines,  Samoa,  Puerto  Rico,  Hayti,  and  the  like. 
But  in  all  these  cases  that  authority  is  lessening,  both 
in  the  British  Empire  and  in  our  own,  and  these  de 
pendencies,  as  we  may  truly  call  them,  are  gradually 
learning  the  art  of  self-management  and  becoming 
independent. 

It  is  to  the  great  self-governing  dominions  that  we 
turn  for  that  which  is  truly  characteristic  of  Britain. 
There  are  five  of  these:  Canada,  Newfoundland, 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  South  Africa,  It  has 

68 


SUPER-EMPIRE 


already  been  explained  that  these  dominions  are  free 
and  independent.     They  make  their  own  laws,  estab 
lish   their   own    tariffs,    make    their   own  Theself_ 
treaties,  choose  their  own  officers,  and  even  governing 
decide  questions  of  peace  and  war  for  them-  c 
selves,  entirely  without  interference  from  the  mother 
country.    In  all  that  regards  these  dominions,  there 
fore,  Britain  is  not  an  empire,  but  a  group  of  nations. 

If  we  ask  what  holds  these  nations  together  it  is  at 
first  rather  difficult  to  answer.  We  are  accustomed 
in  such  cases  to  look  for  some  kind  of  au-  Union 
thority,  some  compulsion.  History  records  without 
no  other  example  of  a  group  of  nations  coercion 
permanently  united  without  some  sort  of  authority 
constraining  them.  But  there  is  no  such  authority, 
no  compulsion,  none  at  all.  There  never  was  such 
a  group  before,  so  far  as  we  know.  No  wonder 
that  German  philosophers,  studying  this  strange 
group,  concluded  that  it  really  was  not  united  at  all ; 
that  if  it  jostled  against  some  crisis,  the  group 
would  break  to  pieces  and  each  member  would  go  after 
its  own  interest  just  as  other  independent  nations  do. 
But  the  great  crisis  of  the  World  War  has  not  separated 
it.  All  the  members  of  the  group  have  taken  their 
place  in  the  line  just  as  though  they  were  obeying  the 
command  of  an  emperor  of  recognized  authority. 
Yet  they  all  decided  the  question  quite  for  themselves 
just  as  we  did.  Is  not  this  the  very  thing  that 
thoughtful  men  are  trying  to  bring  about  in  the  world, 
a  union  among  the  peoples  in  which  all  shall  cooperate 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


fully  in  matters  of  common  concern,  and  yet  do  so 
freely  without  constraint  ? 

This  group  is  not  a  fixed  group.  Indeed  there  is 
nothing  fixed  about  it  except  the  fact  of  the  group 
The  open  itself.  It  is  not  confined  to  a  single  race  or 
member-  speech.  It  has  no  constitution  and  by- 
ship  laws,  no  fixed  initiation  or  rules  of  proce 

dure.  It  is  like  a  group  of  friends.  There  are  no 
terms  of  admission  except  the  ability  to  play  the  part, 
to  be  friendly  and  to  command  the  confidence  of  the 
group.  The  last  addition  to  the  group  is  a  very  wonder 
ful  one,  South  Africa,  only  a  few  years  ago  at  war  with 
the  group,  bitter  against  it,  and  speaking  an  alien  tongue. 
Yet  Britain  had  no  sooner  conquered  South  Africa, 
destroying  all  chance  of  that  dreaded  alliance  with 
Germany  which  was  the  real  cause  of  the  war,  than  she 
gave  South  Africa  back  to  herself,  allowing  her  all 
the  liberties  for  which  she  had  fought,  and  inviting 
her  into  the  group  on  even  terms.  Probably  no  one 
knew  at  that  time  how  soon  the  group  was  to  be  put 
to  the  great  test,  but  when  the  test  came  South  Africa 
was  ready.  In  a  two-hour  speech  her  prime  minister, 
a  Dutchman  who  had  led  her  troops  against  Britain, 
made  it  plain  to  his  countrymen  that  every  considera 
tion  of  safety  and  interest  and  honor  required  them 
to  be  loyal  to  the  new  fellowship,  and  to-day  another 
Dutchman  from  South  Africa  and  another  former 
enemy  is  one  of  the  little  group  of  six  men  who  guide 
the  supreme  affairs  of  Britain. 

Slowly  but  surely  other  peoples  are  approaching  mem- 
70 


SUPER-EMPIRE 


bership  in  this  fellowship.  India  and  Egypt  are  qualify 
ing  for  full  participation,  slowly,  to  be  sure,  yet  so  rapidly 
that  those  who  know  their  peoples  cannot  avoid  occa 
sional  misgivings.  Possibly  others  who  now  depend  on 
British  protection  will  graduate  into  independence  and 
participation  in  the  shaping  of  British  policy. 

But  the  proteges  of  Britain  are  not  the  only  ones 
that  may  strengthen  her  fellowship.  France  is  no 
part  of  the  British  empire  and  never  has  France  and 
been.  A  suggestion  that  she  enter  that  Britain 
empire  in  any  such  formal  sense  as  is  true  of  India  or 
Canada  would  be  resented  by  every  Frenchman.  Yet 
it  seems  likely  that  the  alliance  now  existing  between 
the  two  countries  is  destined  to  be  permanent.  In 
no  part  of  the  world  do  their  interests  now  clash  or 
seem  likely  to  do  so  henceforth.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  is  difficult  to  look  forward  to  a  time  when  certain 
great  dangers  will  not  confront  them  both.  Present 
companionship  in  arms  and  prospective  long  compan 
ionship  rebuilding  the  defenses  of  a  shattered  world 
will  go  far  to  insure  the  permanent  cooperation  of 
these  two  peoples,  so  long  hostile  and  now  so  necessary 
as  friends.  And  permanent  cooperation  and  comity 
based  on  willing  recognition  of  common  interest  is 
all  there  is  to  membership  in  this  group,  all  there  is  to 
the  free  union  of  the  British  Empire.  As  the  group 
grows  it  will  no  longer  call  itself  by  the  misnomer  of 
British  Empire,  nor  will  further  accessions  to  the  group 
call  themselves  British.  The  essence  of  the  group  does 
not  lie  in  its  name  but  in  its  union  and  its  freedom. 


AMERICA. 

WHAT  is  the  relation  of  America  to  this  group  of 
nations  that  are  thus  bound  fast  in  unpledged  friend 
ship?  The  answer  is  that  we  are  a  friend,  a  friend 
of  them  one  and  all.  The  friendship  is  of  long  stand 
ing,  a  development  from  an  earlier  dependence,  and 
a  deep-seated  instinct  of  protection.  It  has  had  its 
ups  and  downs,  it  is  not  ideal ;  but  on  the  whole  it  has 
stood  the  test.  It  may  be  objected  that  under  normal 
conditions  we  are  a  friend  of  all  nations,  but  it  is  clear 
that  the  word  so  used  means  something  much  less. 
So  we  may  say  that  the  right-minded  man  is  the 
friend  of  all  men,  but  we  mean  something  different 
when  we  speak  of  some  one  as  one  of  his  friends.  As 
compared  with  our  friendship  for  these  peoples  who 
are  of  our  family,  who  speak  our  language  and  share 
our  ways  of  thought  and  life,  our  profession  of  friend 
ship  for  all  peoples  is  but  an  empty  phrase,  a  mere 
negative  disclaimer  of  ill  will.  We  are  not  merely 
friendly  toward  this  group.  We  are  their  friend,  and 
they  are  ours. 

This  friendship  is  a  very  substantial  fact.  No 
doubt  exists  in  the  mind  of  any  reasonable  man  that 
it  is  an  adequate  guarantee  of  peace  between  us.  If 
it  were  not,  we  should  not  feel  as  we  do  about  the 
Canadian  boundary  and  the  British  bases  near  the 

72 


AMERICA 


vital  points  of  our  defense.  But  no  man  worries 
about  these.  We  are  sure  the  friendship  will  hold. 
We  do  not  feel  equally  sure  about  any  other  friend 
ship.  We  are  on  friendly  terms  with  Japan  and  Spain, 
but  we  are  by  no  means  certain  that  we  shall  always 
be  so.  These  friendships  are  not  based  on  positive 
attachment,  on  intimacy  of  thought  and  purpose. 
They  are  merely  relations  of  present  amenity.  The 
sentinels  that  guard  the  frontier  salute  each  other  as 
they  pass. 

We  are  friends,  but  we  are  no  more  than  friends. 
We  belong  only  to  ourselves.     We  are  not  even  allies, 
for  we  have  not  pledged  ourselves  to  any  America 
community  of  action,  not  even  in  the  Great  always  in- 
War.     We  have  kept  ourselves  free  from  d«Pendent 
"  entangling  alliances,"  as  we  were  wisely  advised  to 
do  from  the  first.     Between  us  there  exists  only  the 
single  written  pledge  to  submit  our  differences  to  ar 
bitration, —  a    treaty   which   needlessly   binds   us   to 
follow  a  well-established  habit.     No,  we  are  nothing 
more  than  friends. 

But  now  that  we  recall  it,  that  is  all  there  is  to  this 
group.  They  are  friends,  uncoerced  and  unpledged. 
No  written  agreements  are  the  basis  of  this  friendship 
or  are  necessary  to  strengthen  it.  Canada,  in  antici 
pation  of  this  war,  is  asked  to  pledge  her  aid  to  Brit 
ain,  but  refuses  to  do  so.  She  will  not  promise, 
though  she  helps  freely  and  even  coerces  her  citizens 
to  do  so.  Australia  will  not  promise,  will  not  even 
coerce  her  citizens,  but  country  and  citizens  alike 

73 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


help  to  the  limit  of  their  power.  They  are  friends 
and  recognize  the  compulsion  of  friendship,  but  will 
recognize  no  other  compulsion. 

And  since  we  are  friends  of  a  group  whose  only  bond 
is  friendship,  it  follows  that  in  a  sense  we  are  a  member 
of  the  group,  —  a  member  in  a  very  real  sense,  too, 
for  the  reason  for  the  group's  existence  is  its  friendship 
and  peace,  and  we  have  that  friendship  and  peace 
in  assured  permanency. 

Yet  there  is  an  obvious  difference.  They  are 
British  and  we  are  not  and  never  shall  be.  That 
United  but  was  settled  long  ago,  and  no  one,  American 
not  British  or  British,  would  change  it  now.  What 
does  it  mean  to  be  British?  It  does  not  mean  blood, 
for  if  it  did,  we  would  be  as  British  as  Canada  or  Aus 
tralia,  and  far  more  so  than  India  or  Egypt.  What 
makes  Anglo-Saxon  Canada  British  while  Anglo-Saxon 
America  is  not?  It  is  the  flag,  the  governor  general, 
the  king's  head  on  the  postage  stamp.  These  are 
signs  of  political  allegiance.  When  the  king  commands, 
the  subject  must  obey.  Where  the  flag  leads,  he  must 
follow.  The  obligation  suggests  authority  and  seems 
to  rest  on  coercion.  In  all  this  we  have  no  part. 

But  these  things  are  deceptive.  Their  traditional 
meaning  has  wholly  faded  away.  The  king  does 
not  command  nor  does  any  one  command  in  his  name. 
If  he  did,  they  would  not  obey.  The  flag  does  not 
lead  save  where  they  carry  it.  These  symbols,  there 
fore,  are  memories,  not  present  facts.  And  it  is  these 
things  that  are  British,  that  make  those  who  own  them 

74 


AMERICA 


British.  These  things  we  have  discarded  beyond  re 
call.  We  have  no  king  on  our  stamps  and  no  governor 
to  represent  his  nominal  authority.  We  follow  another 
flag.  We  are  not  British  but  American. 

But  though  this  difference  represents  no  important 
living  fact,   it  is  a   real  difference.     These   symbols 
stand  no  longer  for  authority,  for  the  power 
to  command,  but  they  are  still  an  outward   changed 
sign  of  union  which  appeals  powerfully  to  meaning  of 
all  who  call  them  theirs.     Canada  is  as  free   Sym 
to  go  her  own  way  as  we  are,  but  she  is  much  less  likely 
to  do  so.     The  flag  is  familiar  and   the  sovereign's 
countenance,  and  where  these  are  found  the  Canadian 
is   at   home.     No   longer   the   symbols   of   authority, 
they  have  become  very  potent  vehicles  of  sympathy. 
It  still  means  much  to  be  British.     Ruled  as  we  all 
are   by   catchwords  and  signs,   these   symbols  are  a 
powerful  bond  of  union  among  this  group  of  friends, 
a  bond  which  we  do  not  share. 

But  while  this  makes  the  friendship  less  easy  for 
us,  less  intimate,  it  does  not  make  it  less  vital.  The 
crises  of  the  future,  even  more  than  those  of  the  past, 
require  cooperation  on  the  part  of  those  who  have 
ideals  and  interests  to  guard.  Such  cooperation  is 
assured  on  the  part  of  those  whom  we  must  face.  It 
is  necessary  on  the  part  of  those  who  would  face 
them.  Whatever  the  possibilities  of  a  universal  league 
among  the  nations,  it  must  be  apparent  at  a  glance 
that  the  universal  friendliness  upon  which  such  a 
league  must  rest  is  a  far  less  substantial  thing  than  the 

75 


AMERICA  AND   BRITAIN 


bond  that  unites  a  group  of  friends.  If  such  a  league 
ever  becomes  possible,  it  will  be  because  it  is  built 
about  a  substantial  nucleus  of  tried  and  assured 
friends.  Within  this  group,  if  not  in  the  center  of  its 
closest  intimacy,  we  stand,  less  holden  by  outward 
symbols,  but  not  less  dependent  or  depended  upon. 
This  is  our  relation  to  the  greatest  spontaneous  union 
of  free  peoples  that  the  world  has  thus  far  known. 


Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America. 


76 


T 


HE  following  pages  contain  advertisements  of  books 
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BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


America  among  the  Nations 

BY  H.  H.   POWERS,  PH.D. 

$1.50 

"  For  an  understanding  of  this  new  crisis  that  we  are  facing  in 
1918  we  know  of  no  book  more  useful  or  more  searching  or  clearer 
or   more   readable   than   H.  H.  Powers'    'America   among   the 
Nations.'    It  is  really  a  biography,  or  rather,  a  biographical  studyr" 
Its  hero,  however,  is  not  a  man  but  an  imperial  people." 

—  Outlook,  New   York. 

"Mr.  Powers  takes  unusually  broad  views  and  they  are  en 
forced  by  a  historical  knowledge  and  a  logical  development  of 
ideas  that  carry  conviction.  .  .  .  An  excellent  book." 

—  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger. 

"All  the  great  problems  that  here  confront  us  are  discussed 
from  the  standpoint  of  an  international  observer  free  from  cant, 
and  the  result  is  refreshing.  This  is  particularly  true  of  his 
treatment  of  Pan- Americanism."  —  Argonaut,  San  Francisco. 

"Thoughtful,  interesting,    unsentimental    and    stimulating." 

—  New  Republic. 

"Nowhere  is  our  position  in  relation  to  other  nations  discussed 
with  greater  clearness  and  ability."  —  N.  Y.  Herald. 

"Remarkable  acumen  and  insight  .  .  .  clear,  straightforward 
comment  on  some  of  the  most  momentous  questions  of  our 
times."  —  Chicago  Daily  News. 

"As  honest  as  the  day  and  as  fascinating  as  a  mystery  novel .  .  . 
a  finely  informative  treatise."  —  Chicago  Herald. 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  York 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 


The  Art  of  Florence  :    An  Interpretation 

BY  H.  H.   POWERS 

With  Illustrations,  Cloth,  i2mo 

This  book  was  previously  published  under  the  title,  Mornings 
with  Masters  of  Art.  It  has  been  reprinted  with  slight  correc 
tions  in  the  text. 

"Mr.  Powers  deals  with  the  evolution  of  art  from  Constantine 
to  the  death  of  Michael  Angelo.  He  virtually  covers  the  history 
of  Christian  art.  .  .  .  He  has  produced  one  of  the  most  stimu 
lating  books  that  have  been  written  on  this  important  subject. 
His  style  is  lucid,  and  his  thought  is  free  and  individual." 

—  Philadelphia  Public  Ledger. 

"  It  is  very  refreshing  to  come  across  a  work  of  this  independent 
and  personal  quality  in  which  the  author  has  drawn  all  his  in 
spirations  directly  from  the  original  sources."  —  Boston  Transcript. 

"The  result  of  his  daily  contact  with  the  greatest  works  of 
modern  artists  is  to  give  his  book  a  certain  freshness  and  original 
ity  that  is  not  found  in  the  work  of  those  who  deliberately  prepare 
for  the  writing  of  a  book.  The  author  takes  up  all  the  great 
Italian  painters,  but  his  discussions  of  Botticelli,  Donatello, 
Leonardo,  Raphael,  and  Michael  Angelo  are  especially  full  and 
satisfying.  He  is  one  of  those  who  can  see  little  in  'The  Last 
Judgment,'  although  his  appreciation  of  the  work  on  the  vaulted 
ceiling  of  the  Sistine  Chapel  is  the  best  that  we  have  ever  seen. 
The  book  is  elaborately  illustrated  from  photographs,  many  of 
which  are  not  common."  —  San  Francisco  Chronicle. 


THE   MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

Publishers  64-66  Fifth  Avenue  New  Tork 


The  English-speaking  Peoples 

Their  Future  Relations  and  Joint  International 
Obligations 

BY  GEORGE  LOUIS  BEER 

Author  of   "British   Colonial   Policy,    1754-1765,"   "The  Old 
Colonial  System,  1660-1754,"  etc. 

$1.50 

"One  of  the  best,  most  original  and  judicious  attempts  te 
construct  out  of  the  political  anarchy  of  these  times  new  organi 
zations.  .  .  .  Mr.  Beer  modestly  describes  his  book  as  a  livre 
de  circonstance  dealing  with  an  unpredictable  future.  It  is  in 
reality  a  valuable  addition  to  political  science." 

—  The  London  Times,  Literary  Supplement. 

"Distinguished  by  such  brilliantly  demonstrated  criticism  of 
current  political  thought,  by  such  unusual  gifts  of  casuality  and 
practical  ideality  that  it  cannot  fail  of  recognition  as  a  factor  of 
the  first  importance  in  the  moulding  of  public  opinion  in  this 
country."  —  N.  Y.  Times. 

The  End  of  the  War 

BY  WALTER   E.   WEYL 

Author  of  "American  World  Policies,"  "The  New  Democracy," 
etc. 

$2.00 

"The  most  courageous  book  on  politics  published  in  America 
since  the  war  began."  —  The  Dial. 

"An  absorbingly  interesting  book  .  .  .  the  clearest  statement 
yet  presented  of  a  most  difficult  problem."  —  Philadelphia  Ledger. 

"Mr.  Weyl  says  sobering  and  important  things.  .  .  .  His 
plea  is  strong  and  clear  for  America  to  begin  to  establish  her 
leadership  of  the  democratic  forces  of  the  world  ...  to  insure 
that  the  settlement  of  the  war  is  made  on  lines  that  will  produce 
international  amity  everywhere."  —  N.  Y.  Times. 


THE   MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

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